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 2 
Abstract 
We ask three research questions: 1) Did government intervention contribute to the housing 
bubble of 2008? 2) Are the same recovery policies conducted today, on the way out of the 
housing bubble? 3) Are we heading for a new wave of financial crises? What kind and how? 
With theoretical perspective of Minsky and the Austrian school of economics we assess the 
data necessary to explain the course of events and answer our questions in a comparative 
study of USA, the euro area, and Norway. Through qualitative and quantitative analyses, we 
find evidence that the government did contribute to the housing bubble through both fiscal 
and monetary policies. Not only are the same policies conducted today, but also to a much 
larger degree. The answers of the first two questions lay the foundation for the third, where 
we conclude; yes, we are heading for a new wave of financial crises. In USA we find 
potential for stock market crisis through a credit crunch. For the euro area we find general 
potential for malinvestments, and possibility of both credit- and real resource crunch. And, in 
Norway we find potential for a housing- and stock market crisis through a credit crunch – or 
possibly a real resource crunch through housing construction. We do see possibility of rescue 
with increased saving. On the side we find Minsky’s theories well fit to explain the course of 
events and the Austrian school valuable in explaining underlying factors.   
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“The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little 
they really know about what they imagine they can design.” 
– Friedrich von Hayek 
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1. Introduction 
We live in interesting times. The battle of ideas has gained momentum, and our topic of 
financial crises has gained a lot of media attention the last years. Starting out with an IT-
bubble, and still recovering from a series of crises, this has been a turbulent millennia so far. 
Jointly, it has been a period of dramatic maneuvers by authorities. After the IT-bubble the 
Federal Reserve pushed the effective federal funds rate down to a nearly 50 year low. 
Mainstream economist Paul Krugman stated explicitly in 2002 that the Federal Reserve 
needs to “create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.”1 As many Austrian 
economists expected we got a housing bubble which size matched the intensity of the 
policies conducted beforehand.
2
 The crisis spread out within the economies, and had severe 
consequences. Now we are once again recovering from a financial crisis, although some 
might argue that the recovery is accomplished (which vary among regions). The Federal 
Reserve is determined to keep the federal funds rate between zero and 0.25 percent for as 
long as unemployment is above 6.5 percent.
3
 Earlier in 2013 US mortgage rates hit a new 
record low, at 2.56 percent.
4
 With expected increases in housing prices, people basically gets 
paid to lend money. This way, the expectations on prices is self-fulfilling. We are also about 
to get a new chairwoman of the Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen, who is a supporter of loose 
monetary policy and doesn’t provide any reasons to believe that she carries any new ideas.5 
All in all, the table is set for the history to repeat itself. 
1.1 Research questions  
Our objective is to assess whether the actions taken by the central banks – of USA, the euro 
area, and Norway – on the way out of the IT-bubble did contribute to the housing bubble. 
From there we will assess whether the same policies of rescue is conducted today, on the 
way out of the housing bubble. Our findings in this process will be the foundation for the last 
part of this thesis; whether we are heading for a new financial crisis. From this suspicion, we 
have come up with the following three questions that we are going to investigate.  
                                                 
1 Klein (2013) 
2 Ludwig von Mises Institute (2013b) 
3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (b) 
4 Christie (2013) 
5 Fontevecchia (2013) 
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1. Did government intervention contribute to the housing bubble of 2008? 
2. Are the same recovery policies conducted today, on the way out of the housing 
bubble?  
3. Are we heading for a new wave of financial crises? What kind and how? 
These are questions many have opinions on. Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences laureates 
Paul Krugman and Friedrich von Hayek would give completely different answers. Over the 
course of studying economics, we have found the questions both interesting and 
controversial. Mainstream thought in Norway is dominated by Keynesianism. This is our 
contribution to a broader intellectual debate.  
1.2 Theoretical framework 
Writing from a Keynesian perspective would in many ways be easier, considering the 
commonly known context it is stated in. However, we think that these ideas are wrong, and 
the source of present economic problems. We are therefore building our theoretical 
framework on other set of ideas.   
We are mainly going to use a selected part of the Austrian school of economics. Roger 
Garrison’s framework of the business cycle and his understanding of the central Austrian 
economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek are essential. To shed some broader 
light on our topic, we will also include theories of Hyman Minsky.  
The combination of these theories provides in our opinion a broad and strong framework. 
Minsky is well established in academia, and his theories are strong in explaining the course 
of events. However, we think the deterministic nature of his theories miss some underlying 
factors. This is where the Austrian school comes in, with its deductive method and focus on 
primaries. Also, Minsky is a mathematician and the Austrian school is known to have a 
small mathematic platform. We therefore see value in the combination of the two schools of 
thought.  
1.3 Scope and limitations  
We are doing a comparative study of the regions; USA, the euro area, and Norway. The 
relevant time scope is from the bust of the IT-bubble, which peaked in 2000, to today, and 
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the near future, i.e. this millennia and the near future. Because of USA’s leading 
characteristics in business cycles, there might be some favoritism towards assessing them 
against the other regions.  
We are going to have a broad assessment, and embarking on such a complex topic in a thesis 
calls for limitations. We will include fiscal policy. However, we carry the assumption that 
monetary policy is far more effective and essential to business cycles, and will therefore be 
our main focus.  
The labor market, although interesting and important, will not have any priority in this 
thesis. We argue that it is not a primary to business cycles, but a secondary to deeper and 
stronger economic forces.  
1.4 Structure  
We will start out with two chapters of economic theory. First, chapter two will be primarily 
on economist Hyman Minsky’s theories. Second, we direct our focus to the Austrian school 
of economics in chapter three, where Garrison’s model will be presented together with some 
applications. Chapter four will be on our data and methodology for research.  
These lay the foundation for assessing our research questions. We will have one chapter for 
each of the three questions, discussing the theories against empirical evidence. The 
assessments in each chapter are going to be of a somewhat different nature. The first one, 
chapter five, will be more empirical, with the evidence assessed within the structure of the 
theories. The second, chapter six, will be much less focused on quantitative empirical 
evidence and turn to qualitative and a more deductive discussion. The third, chapter seven, 
will be a combination of the two former in method, and make more room for our own 
reflections. We will make conclusions in chapter nine. 
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2. The Minsky school of economics 
This chapter will basically consist of theories of Hyman Minsky. We will also include a 
systemized Minsky model by Grytten. This will be followed be a brief presentation of the 
loss function and some criticism towards Minsky.  
2.1 Hyman Minsky on financial crises 
Minsky
6
 states that in the early stages of a boom, the leveraging of investments increases due 
to an improvement in confidence and credit. Owners of an inherited stock of capital assets 
find themselves with an unused margin of “borrowing power” due to their liability structures 
being compatible with a previous stage of confidence. This margin provides, just as well as 
retained earnings, a basis for the expansion of ownership of capital assets.  
Owners of shares might come to view debt-financed share purchases as an alternative to debt 
financing by the owning organization in positions in capital assets. The same confidences 
that influence the financing of corporations affect the financing of share ownership. 
Increasing willingness to borrow to purchase shares is likely to follow the increased 
willingness to debt-finance acquisitions of capital-assets. Given a fixed supply of shares, the 
market price of shares is now likely to increase. 
The additional debt-financed investments in capital-asset production and in share positions, 
are likely to come from two sources: 1) the creation of money [emphasis added], and; 2) 
portfolio diversification of wealth owners. Minsky refers to Keynes
7
 who states that banks 
generally are in the middle of the transition from low to high scale of activity.  
Banking could not exist without well-developed loan and security markets among banks. 
This system allows banks to always speculate in their ability to refinance their positions in 
assets as withdrawals of deposits take place. During a boom, banks can attempt to finance 
additional loans by selling out their positions in marketable securities. The securities remain 
within the economic system as a substitute for cash in some non-bank portfolio. This 
substitution of cash and securities is made possible by higher interest rates. Banks buy back 
                                                 
6 Minsky (1975), will be the primary source of this subchapter, if not otherwise is stated. 
7 Keynes (1937, p. 668) 
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their lending ability by selling their investment portfolio to households, corporate holders of 
cash, and non-bank financial intermediaries. 
Further on, Minsky explains that American banks have the opportunity to raise the ratio of 
bank liabilities to bank reserves by substituting promises to lend (lines-of-credit) for actual 
loans. This is done by substituting time for demand deposits, and by varying the efficiency in 
which reserves are utilized through interbank reserve transactions, i.e., transactions in federal 
funds. The effective quantity of money is determined endogenously. Firms are also able to 
sell their debts in the open market, resulting in absorption and activation of short-term cash 
balances of other units’.8 These types of commercial paper are in other words quite similar to 
money as a “fine temporary abode of purchasing power”.9 Increased external finance results 
in both an increase in the money supply, and decrease in idle cash balances.  
The result of portfolio substitutions by both liability issuers and asset holders is an elastic 
supply curve of finance being created in the aggregate and in the short run. In the early stage 
of a boom the terms of financing does not change much. This occurs even though debt-
financing is expanding rapidly. However, as the boom develops and the supply curve of 
finance from portfolio substitution is absorbed, financing terms can rise abruptly. If earlier 
deals were financed with short-term borrowings, one might witness increased financing 
charges feeding back upon and adversely affecting the value of said deals as they are 
refinanced. Banks start to rely more on managing their liabilities with the intention of 
accommodating borrowers. Borrowing firms will now engage in active liability management 
to finance their asset position. The progress of a boom sees liability experimentation on three 
levels: 
1. Firms engage in debt-financing to a greater degree. 
2. Households and firms cut their cash and liquid-asset holdings relative to their 
debt. 
3. Banks increase their loans at the expense of the holdings of securities, such as 
government debt. 
Another aspect of boom is the layering of debts. Non-bank financial institutions use bank 
debt, open-market debt, and longer-term bonds to acquire more debts. This debt is built upon 
a common foundation, namely, the quasi-rents (Q’s) earned by income producing 
                                                 
8 Households, firms, and financial institutions are referred to as units 
9 Minsky (1975, p. 120) 
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businesses.
10
 Another layer of debt is added when households take on more debt based on 
their income (wages). As financial intermediation and secondary markets grows, even more 
sets of assets present themselves as liquid assets in portfolios. These assets function as 
substitutes to money. 
As the boom progresses, portfolios will become much more heavily weighted with debt-
financed positions. The speculative demand for money will decrease. The owners of capital 
assets will commit larger portions of their expected cash flows from operations (Q’s) to the 
payment of financial commitments (CC). Banks will turn to ownership of loans instead of 
investing, and apply active liability management to increase their scale of operations. 
Different financial institutions will actively pursue funds which increases their scale of 
operations. Firms and households will substitute non-money financial assets for money as 
their liquid reserves. 
Operating and financial units, who now possess elaborated liability structures, will develop 
cash-payment commitments which exceed the cash receipts they will get from the contracts 
they own on the short term. These commitments are also exceeding the receipts from 
operations. This creates a scenario where units, in order to fulfill their cash-payment 
commitments, now must refinance by selling either assets or liabilities. This will in turn lead 
to a decline in assets prices. 
The process of selling financial assets or liabilities in order to fulfill cash-payment 
commitments is called “position making”.11 The position corporations have to be finance is 
the capital assets necessary for production; and for financial firms, the “position” refers to 
the assets with poor secondary markets. 
When a boom develops, units continuously have to undertake greater and greater position-
making activity. As the ability to borrow from one source to repay a commitment gets 
exhausted, one can chose either to slow down (or bring to a halt) asset acquisition, or to start 
selling out positions. These actions involve, for operating firms, a reduction in debt-financed 
new investments.   
                                                 
10 Quasi-rents are defined as income earned on a sunk cost. Farlex Financial Dictionary (2012) 
11 Minsky (1975, p. 122) 
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Increased optimism amongst firms and bankers shifts investments (I) from I1 to I2 in figure 
2.1. As optimism fades, I is reduces back to I1. Units recognize the danger tied up to their 
liability structures, and attempts are made to sell or reduce assets in order to repay debts, 
resulting in a fall in asset prices. These actions are the result of the increased speculative 
demand for money.  
 
Figure 2.1 Financing conditions and investment. Source: Minsky 1975 
 
Figure 2.2 The Pk-money relation. Source: Minsky 1975 
Price on capital assets expressed as a function of money supply and quasi-rents Pk(M,Q), 
will now fall from Pk1 to Pk2, depict in figure 2.2, which is what happens in a crisis. Minsky 
notes that a “decline in share prices is one aspect of a crisis situation”.12  
                                                 
12 Minsky (1975, p. 122) 
 16 
Minsky
13
 presents two types of debt-deflation processes after a crisis. First, the demand price 
of capital assets is derived by the market capitalization of quasi-rents, and is greater than the 
supply price, as of figure 2.3. Here, financiers invest less than their ability due to high 
borrower’s risk – while, on the contrary, households are increasingly demanding credit.  
 
Figure 2.3 Borrower’s risk and debt deflation. Source: Minsky 1975 
Second, Minsky explains that investments tend to be zero due to the demand price for capital 
assets falling below the supply price (see figure 2.4). Internally generated funds will be 
utilized to repay debt. Long-term debt will be used to fund maturing short-term debt. This 
tends to sustain, and/or raise long term interest rates. Banks can have lending ability but be 
unwilling, just as borrowers, to put it into use. This results in declining short-term interest 
rates. At this point the economy experience debt-deflation, increased unemployment, and 
depression.  
Minsky argues that stabilizing efforts, such as government expenditures, tax schedules, and 
central bank intervention as lender of last resort, will bring debt-deflation and the 
accompanying income decline to a halt. Due to the debt-deflation’s “immediate and 
lingering effect upon investment and desired debt positions”,14 one can still expect a period 
of persistent unemployment. However, as the effects of debt-deflation wear off, a recovery 
and expansion is likely to occur. As the memory of past disaster slowly fades away, more 
                                                 
13 Minsky (1975, p. 123), based on Fisher (1933) 
14 Minsky (1975, p. 125) 
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adventuresome financing starts paying off to the first movers, others follow, and a new boom 
is expanding.  
 
Figure 2.4 Supply price greater than demand price. Source: Minsky 1975 
2.2 Grytten’s model of “Minskian stages” 
In an article written by Ola H. Grytten,
15
 a more compact summary of the Minsky model is 
presented. Based upon the theory that was presented above and another paper by Minsky,
16
 a 
five-stage model is developed. We want to include these stages as they provide a clear frame 
of reference in our analyses later, and they also serve as a good summary of what has been 
explained above.  
The first stage is entitled Displacement. Here, monetary abundance arises in the aftermath of 
an exogenously given macroeconomic shock in demand. Such a shock can be caused by a 
political or financial event, but also wars and great innovations. Nonetheless, the economy 
leaves its natural path of growth with a positive shift. 
From the above, stage two Overtrading follows. As the positive shock raises profitability 
expectations above fundamental values, activity increases. The economy has now entered an 
exponential face of growth. Psychological aspects are, as indicated, influencing the cause of 
events. 
Stage three, entitled Monetary expansion, follows. The exogenously given shock, along with 
overtrading, produces an increased demand for money and credit. This increases overall 
                                                 
15 Grytten (2003) 
16 Minsky (1982) 
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demand, which again increases the demand for money and credit even further. The process 
feeds on itself, and after a while the amount of money combined with a great deal of 
optimism, leads to the buildup of financial bubbles.  
Due to monetary growth surpassing the growth in the real economy, a positive financial 
bubble has been created. Stage four is entitled Revulsion; as the bubble bursts, the turning 
point presents itself with a sharp decline in the monetary growth. The economy is now in a 
severe decline. 
The last stage is named Discredit. As profitability expectations fall below what fundamental 
values would indicate, the demand for money and credit experiences a negative shift. This 
creates a negative bubble, as the economy falls below its natural path. An economic crisis 
has arisen.  
2.3 Setting the target rate 
In order to understand the theoretical framework used by Norges Bank (the central bank of 
Norway) in setting the target interest rate,
17
 we will now present a model known as the loss 
function. Even though several other aspects are included in the decision of altering the target 
interest rate, we believe this model illustrates the general idea behind – all our regions – 
central banks’ decision making.18 
As central banks’ target inflation they will in the short run face a trade-off between price 
stability and stability in the real economy.
19
 This trade-off is known as minimizing a loss 
function which includes both inflation variability and output variability. The central bank 
should choose an interest rate that minimizes the discounted “losses” (  ) in all future 
periods, for the following function (1):
20
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17 Before it was modified in 2012. Norges Bank (2012a) 
18 This assumption is taken in relation to what we find preparing 5.2 Monetary policy 
19 Qvigstad (2005) 
20 Mork, (2004) 
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Here, we learn that      indicates the inflation j number of periods from the time the 
decision was made, and that the denominator    refers to the targeted level of inflation.      
is the output gap (output less the potential output) in the same future period.    is the 
expectations held by the central bank based on the information available at time (t). The 
parameter   is the time preference in weighing different periods up against each other. At 
last,   denotes the relative weight placed on output-gap stabilization by the central bank, 
compared to the targeted inflation.
21
 
The first order condition states that the interest rate should strike a balance between 
stabilizing inflation around the target, and achieving stable developments in the real 
economy.
22
 This implies that in a given period, “loss” is minimized if the expected marginal 
benefit of bringing inflation closer to the target equals the expected marginal cost of this 
policy for the real economy. We choose here to disregard the fact that the first order 
condition depend on a discretionary monetary policy or an optimal precommitment policy.
23
 
2.4 Criticism  
A common critique of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis is the paradox-of-debt 
argument.
24
 This paradox refers to the phenomenon where the attempts of individual firms’ 
to reduce indebtedness by cutting investment spending, actually leads to increasing 
indebtedness as the reduction in aggregate demand and profits makes firms rely more on 
debt finance. In an expansion phase, the opposite is true. Since Minsky argues for an 
increased indebtedness during expansions, he is at error according to critics, who argue that 
debt-ratios tend to decrease (increase) during expansions (contractions). 
In relation to the 2007 crisis, Minsky’s model has received criticism for only providing a 
partial and incomplete account. Palley recognizes that the processes brought forward in 
Minsky’s model played a critical role in the crisis.25 However; he believes that Minsky 
misses what he believes to be the underlying causes; around 1980 the neoliberal growth 
model was implemented.  
                                                 
21 Ibid. and Svensson (2003) 
22 Qvigstad (2005) 
23 Walsh (2003) 
24 Ryoo (2013) 
25 Palley (2010) 
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3. The Austrian school of economics  
As an alternative to different branches of Keynesianism, we have selected Austrian 
economics to shed light on business cycles. The Austrian school is not known for 
macroeconomics. However, principles from earlier Austrian works have lately been 
systematized in more modern terms. Roger W. Garrison provides in his book, Time and 
Money,
26
 an apparatus for an Austrian perspective on a macro level. In this chapter we will 
present this apparatus with applications and criticism.  
3.1 Capital-based macroeconomics 
Garrison presents capital-based macroeconomics graphically with three major elements. 
These are the market for loanable funds, the production possibilities frontier and the 
intertemporal structure of production. The framework allows us to look at several situations, 
e.g. boom and bust. It also makes it possible to see a clear distinction between sustainable 
and unsustainable growth, with its focus on intertemporal allocation of resources.  
With the market for loanable funds we are able to include the consequences of deficit 
finance policies, which is particularly interesting in our case.  Certain aspects of tax reform 
may be dealt with through the production possibilities frontier. In presenting the model we 
will first consider each of the three elements before putting it together.  
The market for loanable funds  
 
Figure 3.1 The market for loanable funds. Source: Garrison 2001 
 
                                                 
26 Garrison (2001) 
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Loanable funds are, as demonstrated graphically in figure 3.1, given by its supply and 
demand curves, with the interest rate on the vertical axis. The supply is determined by the 
willingness to lend, and the demand is determined by the willingness to borrow – at different 
interest rates. On the horizontal axis there is savings and investment.  
Garrison mentions a modification that he consider common and needed in macroeconomics. 
Net lending is saving – i.e. every dollar borrowed by the borrower represents a dollar saved 
by the lender. This explains why savings and investment are on the same horizontal axis. 
The supply of loanable funds, therefore, consists of earnings not consumed but in work. It 
may be understood as “Investable resources”, which is also consistent with Keynes’ view.  
As the supply of loanable funds represents savers’ intentions to lend money in the market, 
the demand for loanable funds is represented by the borrowers’ willingness to invest in the 
production process. Investment refers to the means of production, for example machinery 
and tools but also goods in process, durable capital goods and human capital.  
The loanable funds market coordinate consumer preferences with the investors’ production 
plans. This is coordinated through consumers who spend one part of their income and save 
the rest. The rate of savings function as a signal to the entrepreneurs of how much demand 
there will be in the future. In societies that save a lot, many resources are going to 
investment, and the possibility of future consumption is growing. If a society – on the other 
hand – consumes a lot today, they will have a smaller cake tomorrow.  
If there are discrepancies between input and output prices and the rate of interest, individuals 
will take advantage. With an interest rate lower (higher) than the expected return of an 
investment project, the entrepreneur will invest (sit on the fence). This market mechanism 
reduces, not eliminates, discrepancies; it is not realistic that every participant will earn the 
market rate of return/interest.  
In the loan rate of interest there are two notable differences between conventional 
macroeconomics and capital-based macroeconomics. On the demand side, expected losses 
from discoordination is conventionally measured as business confidence, and explained by 
psychology. This interpretation misses the underlying factors. Capital-based 
macroeconomics calls for an economic, not psychological, explanation. On the supply side 
we find a similar contrast. Conventional macroeconomics measures lenders’ risk with 
liquidity preferences. Garrison also points out Keynes’s fetish for liquidity in this matter, and 
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advocates also here an economic explanation. In other words, capital-based macroeconomics 
find no reason for change in business confidence or lenders’ risk if there is no analysis of the 
market process suggesting so.  
As shown in figure 3.1 the market for loanable funds, which identify the rate of interest 
through the equilibrium between savings and investment, is quit conventional. However, 
there is a major difference between conventional – especially Keynesian – macroeconomics 
and capital-based macroeconomics in its application. The lack of connection between short 
run and long run is viewed as a great weakness of conventional macroeconomics, as they are 
separated and conflicting.  
The production possibilities frontier  
Although it does appear, the production possibilities frontier (PPF) is never an integrated 
part of conventional macroeconomic analysis. The PPF shows the tradeoff between two 
alternative outputs that are negatively related. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the case of butter and 
guns. As the figure indicates, this economy has to give up an ever-increasing amount of 
butter to produce one more gun. Resources that are more suitable for the production of butter 
give less utility in the production of guns.  
 
Figure 3.2 The production possibilities frontier. Source: Garrison 2001 
The same principle goes for the tradeoff between consumption (C) and investment (I). With 
investment on the horizontal axis as in figure 3.3 – which demonstrates the application of 
contraction, stationarity, and expansion – it’s easy to make the connection to the market for 
loanable funds. Together with saving (S), the terms are conveniently linked to conventional 
macroeconomics, where we find the same aggregates. It is necessary for the understanding 
of the model to point out that investment here include capital maintenance and capital 
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expansion. At some point of the frontier, the investment is just enough for maintenance 
which means a stationary/no-growth economy. If we move south-east along the frontier we 
enter an economy in expansion/growth. Similarly, a tradeoff in the direction of consumption 
implies a contracting economy.  
 
Figure 3.3 PPF with contraction, stationarity, and expansion. Source: Garrison 
2001 
To apply the PPF to a mixed economy one has to take government spending (G) and taxes 
(T) into account. If T is a “head tax” and the budget is in balance (G=T) the model represents 
the private part of a mixed economy. What this means for our model is that the PPF 
demonstrates the production possibilities after the government have had “its share”.  
Now the model includes a government with a balanced budget. To integrate deficit spending, 
i.e. spending financed by borrowing, we can simply relabel one axis in the market for 
loanable funds. With the horizontal axis named I+Gd, deficit-financed government spending, 
Gd (or G-T) is included – although the possibility of finance through inflation is ignored. In 
sum, the PPF demonstrates sustainable combinations of C and I – in a fully employed 
economy – for a private economy or the private sector of a mixed economy.  
The intertemporal structure of production  
Attention to the stages in production is conventionally given to avoid double counting when 
aggregating indexes of national income. The aggregated output is often calculated by 
summing the added value in each stage of production. This practice put emphasis only to the 
value dimension. Capital-based macroeconomics allows for emphasis also on the time 
dimension.  
The structure of production is presented graphically in figure 3.4. This figure is maybe best 
known as the Hayekian triangle. Production time and stages in production is represented by 
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the horizontal leg. The value of goods in process is represented by the vertical distance 
between the horizontal axis and the hypotenuse. The value added, on a continuous basis, is 
expressed by the slope of the hypotenuse. The linearity of the figure is chosen for simplicity, 
Garrison argue that this – over an exponential construction – don’t inflict any relevant or 
significant loss.   
 
Figure 3.4 The structure of production. Source: Garrison 2001 
It’s necessary to point out that the examples of stages along the horizontal axis in figure 3.4 
(e.g. mining, refining and manufacturing) is for illustration purposes only. It could be more 
or less of these stages, five is selected for convenience. Notice also that this axis has a 
double interpretation, time and stages.  
The Hayekian triangle could give an old fashion impression as the example indicates a 
commodity intensive economy, contrary to today’s service intensity. However, the triangle is 
just as applicable for any processes that imply an employment of means for the achievement 
of ends. In the perspective of a consultant agency, a modern application of the stages could 
be; education and training, before working in the field with clientele.  
The triangle stops at output. This makes it adaptable with the consumption axis on the PPF 
figure. It could be argued that an inclusion of stages of consumption would make it more 
realistic, but according to Garrison it would not contribute much analytically. As presented, 
the output is consumed immediately.  
There are many possible deviations and examples of nonlinearities in dealing with this 
construction. Garrison points to the original work of Hayek in assessing such problems. One 
of the essences of the triangle, the time dimension, is as here presented considered adequate 
and not simplistic.    
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The macroeconomics of capital structure  
The interconnections of the three figures, in figure 3.5, are obvious by their common axes. 
The structure of production (Hayekian triangle) is connected with the PPF through their 
common vertical axis of consumption, and the PPF and the loanable-funds market are 
connected through their common horizontal axis of investment. We now have a model 
representing a wholly private economy or the private sector of an economy which is mixed 
and have a balanced public budget. A less explicit connection between the stages of 
production and the loanable-funds market is made through the slope of the hypotenuse of the 
structure of production which reflects the market-clearing rate of interest, Garrison argues. 
The stages of production have continuous input, which make its hypotenuse reflect more 
than the rate of interest, but they do move together in the same direction. If the consumers 
have long term preferences in a free market it will result in increased saving and thereby put 
a downward pressure on the interest rate (positive shift in supply in the market for loanable 
funds). At the same time, the earlier stages of production will increase and expand, as the 
entrepreneurs get the message from the consumers through the lower interest rate that they 
plan to delay their consumption. The later stages of production will decrease with the same 
mechanism. This is how lower interest rates are connected to a flatter hypotenuse of the 
Hayekian triangle in a free market.   
 
Figure 3.5 The macroeconomics of capital structure. Source: Garrison 2001 
As the PPF shows possible combinations of C and I in a full employed economy, or it could 
be called an economy with natural unemployment, it is implied that the market for loanable 
funds shows the natural rate of interest.  
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We now have a model for a steady state economy, where investment is just enough to 
maintain the overall size. It is referred to this as the “evenly rotating economy”. This gives 
us an initial framework for further assessment, e.g. secular growth and cyclical fluctuations.  
3.2 The application of the model 
When it comes to the application of the Garrison model, we will present two cases. The first 
will be the macroeconomics of secular growth. To understand a malfunctioning economy we 
have to first understand the natural case – the case without intervention. This will be 
followed by the application on boom and bust, which is a central aspect in our thesis.  
The macroeconomics of secular growth  
The general case of an economy is usually expansion. Secular growth occurs without 
interference from both policy and technological changes. It is driven by investment above 
the level of maintenance. Figure 3.6 shows two steps of secular growth, from t0 to t1 and t1 to 
t2. It depicts the growth-related shifts in all the three components of the framework.  
 
Figure 3.6 Secular growth. Source: Garrison 2001 
An intuitive explanation of the PPF expansion is that the cake is getting bigger, and there are 
more resources available for investment or consumption – as the shifts in t0-2 indicates. In the 
market for loanable funds both supply and demand increases. As the economy grows, the 
share of savings increases. This is balanced by the demand for loan; businesses expect higher 
consumption as the PPF is growing – and the interest rate thereby remains constant. Garrison 
points out that increased wealth has historically been followed by a decrease in time 
preferences. The mechanism behind this phenomenon is that the supply of loanable funds 
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outpaces the demand. To use the cake example: You can only eat that much cake – and if it 
grows fast enough, the percentage of consumption will decline. This is consistent with the 
conventional view on long-run macroeconomics. 
Assuming away the impact of time preferences, the Hayekian triangle shifts outwards with 
an unchanged slope in the hypotenuse – which is consistent with the unchanged interest rate. 
Taking the mechanism of time preferences into account, the shift would have been larger in 
the earlier stages due to lower interest rates.  
Boom and bust 
By separating the roles of savers and monetary authority, capital-based macroeconomics 
makes the identification of differences between artificially boom and genuine growth 
possible. Garrison names two reasons why monetary considerations are relevant. First, 
relative-price changes are attributed to monetary injections and initiate the boom. Here, the 
focus is not on the quantity of money and the following change in general price levels, but 
on the new moneys point of entry and the following changes in relative prices. These prices 
is what, over time, govern the allocation of resources. Second and similar to the first, 
monetary injections set motion to market processes that work contrary to that of the markets 
own, like secular growth. Money is therefore described as a loose joint, and through credit 
expansion it is the trigger for cycles.  
Figure 3.7 demonstrates the effect of credit expansion. Three considerations needs to be 
taken into account: 1) the assumption of unchanging intertemporal preferences; 2) The 
assumption that a monetary authority (referred to as the Federal Reserve) controls the money 
supply, and; 3) The supply of loanable funds does not only include saving, but also funds 
that the Federal Reserve has made available.  
Federal Reserve is known to have three policy tools,
27
 which it uses to change the money 
supply. Namely:  
1. The required reserve ratio: Imposed on commercial banks by the Federal Reserve.  
2. The discount rate: set and used by Federal Reserve to control the level of commercial 
banks’ direct short-term lending. 
                                                 
27 Garrisons Time and Money is written in 2001, before quantitative easing (QE) was initiated. We will discuss the nature of 
QE in 6.2 Monetary policies  
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3. Open market operations: Federal Reserve acquires securities by the Treasury and 
lend to the government.  
In essence, and in regard to the application of capital-based macroeconomics, these three is 
merely three variations of money creation. They all contribute to the positive shift in the 
money supply curve, in figure 3.7. Garrison argues the following:  
1. A reduction in the required reserve ratio gives the commercial banks more funds 
available for lending. They have to reduce interest rates to lend out more.  
2. A reduced discount rate would, together with competition between banks, cause the 
banks to borrow more and lend out to reduced rates of their own.  
3. The Federal Reserve’s purchases of Treasury securities is in effect lending to the 
government. This pushes down the interest rates, as it is an increase in lending.  
 
Figure 3.7 Boom and bust. Source: Garrison 2001 
∆MC in figure 3.7 refers to the new money, which takes form as additional credit. This is not 
necessarily all the new money made; there could also be some increase in holdings by ∆MH – 
which Garrison regards as of secondary importance to this analysis.  
The new money put a downward pressure on the interest rates. This fall is relative to the 
natural rate. If the natural rate was to increase to the same extent as the decrease due to 
policy, the market rate would be unchanged. This has been defended in the name of stability, 
but it dismisses the underlying economic realities.  
It is in the relationship between saving and investment that figure 3.6 secular growth and 
figure 3.7 boom and bust starts to differ. In figure 3.6, the increase in investment has its 
sources in increased savings. Figure 3.7 on the other hand, experience increased investment 
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driven by credit from new money, not saving. The market for loanable funds gets a split, 
sending two opposite signals. The lower interest rate pulls in the direction of more 
investment on the PPF, but at the same time, pulls for more consumption at the expense of 
saving. The candle is now burning at both ends. In the PPF, consumers are pulling north 
while investors are pulling east. We get a situation north-east outside the PPF curve, i.e. an 
unsustainable combination of consumption and investment. The contrary forces do not 
cancel each other out at first because of the looseness of money. The fact that the boom is 
unsustainable is not accepted by the market yet. When it is, the bust becomes real.  
The difference between capital-based macroeconomics and conventional economics – at this 
point – is the entrance of new money. As presented here, the new money enters through the 
credit markets, and effects interest rates. Analyzed with the Phillip curve, the new money 
somehow enters directly in consumers spending, and effects wage rates. Garrison argues this 
conventional view suffers by some factual problems.  
The contrary forces can also be seen in the Hayekian triangle. The forces pulling for 
investment creates a less steeply sloped hypotenuse. The low interest rate makes new 
projects look profitable in earlier stages than before. Some resources are gathered for this 
expansion from the intermediate and later stages of production. At the same time, a steeper 
sloped hypotenuse than the initial one shows the favoring of consumption over saving. This 
creates an expansion of the later stages. Some resources are gathered for this expansion from 
the intermediate and earlier stages.  
The result is expansions in the earlier stage (malinvestment
28
) and later stage (over-
consumption) on the expense of the intermediate. This contradiction is viewed as a signal of 
an unsustainable boom. A restructuring of capital is set into motion from the earlier stages, 
but the hypotenuse turns into a broken line. There are not enough resources to carry it out. 
The investors are facing constraints that were not implied in the early phase of the boom. 
The interest rate is driven up by the bidding on resources and demand for credit to 
restructure and finish projects. This effect leads to the unusual high interest rates seen before 
busts.  
                                                 
28 Ludwig von Mises Institute (2013a) defines malinvestment as investment in “wrong lines of production”, i.e. fallacious 
allocation that will end in loss.  
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Ultimately some projects are abandoned, and unemployment rises. The north-east movement 
in the PPF, pulled by consumers and investors, is ultimately won by the investors due to 
their access to new money. Due to this bias the bust takes us around clockwise in the PPF, 
and with the overproduction during the boom, we turn inside the PPF curve. We are ending 
up with a higher investment- and lower consumption intensity than the initial mix.  
3.3 Fiscal and regulatory issues 
Although we are primarily focusing on monetary policy, we want to include some theory on 
fiscal policy which can be assessed with the same framework of capital-based 
macroeconomics. We are still using Garrison (2001).  
Deficit finance  
In Garrison’s example, we look at a portion of the public sector which was tax-financed 
before becoming deficit-financed. For this purpose government spending is held constant, 
which means that the deficit is accompanied by tax-cut. We assume that the spending is 
outside the national economy – which makes indirect effects of the spending on the 
allocation of resources irrelevant in our context.  
The government issues debt, which makes a positive shift in the demand for loanable funds. 
The result is an upward pressure on the interest rate. The private savers preferences however, 
is not changed but still expressed by the initial demand (from before the positive shift). With 
the new higher interest rate they demand less funds for investment – which constitutes higher 
consumption.  
The increase in consumption and the higher interest rate takes effect in the structure of 
capital. Long term investment is less profitable. Resources are placed in the later stages to 
meet the increased demand of consumption. The effect is a slower growing economy.  
If the spending occurs in the national economy, the picture would be more complex. 
Spending on infrastructure for example would make smaller effect than illustrated here, but 
only to the degree it meets real demand.  
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Deficit spending 
In this case, contrary to the above, the government spends funds on the same kind of areas 
that the private sector normally would do. We assume that the tax level is held constant, so 
the increased borrowing is followed by increased spending. The government is now included 
in the horizontal axis on the PPF; resources is being bid away from the private sector. We 
will briefly present the application of deficit spending on inert government projects and on 
infrastructure.  
Inert government projects are the case where the government use borrowed funds to bid 
away resources from the private sector for projects that the market would not engage in. Also 
here we get the positive shift in demand for loanable funds, which puts an upward pressure 
on the interest rate. The PPF, with the government’s deficit investment included, becomes 
more investment-intensive. The higher interest rate drives private incentives away from the 
earlier stages of production. Together with the assumption that the government invest 
improperly, the Hayekian triangle shrinks. The private sectors loss of resources is also 
reflected by decreased consumption.  
In the case of deficit spending on infrastructure, there is an assumption that the government 
allocates resources in the same manner as the market would. This means that the fact that the 
government doesn’t respond to prices and changes in interest rates like other market 
participants needs to be taken into consideration. The Hayekian triangle reacts as if the 
growth were induced by an increase in savings: increase in the earlier stages and decrease in 
the later. However, in the market for loanable funds the interest rate is pushed up by the 
government’s increased demand. Contrary to the previous examples, the hypotenuse of the 
structure of capital gets flatter while the interest rate increases. Earlier stages of production 
are favored at the same time as the interest rate increases.  
3.4 Inverted yield curves  
The capital-based approach to macroeconomics argues that the business cycle is initially 
disturbed by monetary injections. These injections causes credit expansions which distorts 
price signals, and thereby the entrepreneurs ability to allocate resources efficient. The new 
credit has two major opposing effects on the yield curve, the Wicksell effect and the Fisher 
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effect. They are essential to the theory of inverted yield curves and will be briefly presented, 
before we look further at Paul Francis Cwiks PhD dissertation
29
 on inverted yield curves – 
which will be the primary source of this whole subchapter. Cwik uses the same framework, 
capital-based macroeconomics, and his dissertation is approved and directed by Roger 
Garrison himself. A yield curve is the graphical relationship between interest rates and time 
to maturity for – in this case government – bonds. When the bonds mature, the debt they are 
representing are paid off.  
The Wicksell effect 
To be precise, the effect referred to in this context is the “Interest Wicksell Effect”. The new 
money which takes the form of credit, ∆MC in figure 3.7, reduces the market rate of interest 
all across the yield curve. The underlying process in the effect is basic supply and demand 
economics. When the quantity of a good is increased the price decreases. It is necessary – for 
our case – to stress that this fact includes money as well as any other good.  
The Fisher effect  
However, the money injections that are causing the Wicksell effect also change the markets 
expectations of future inflation (increase in general price levels). These expectations drive 
the interest rate up. The Fisher effect is stronger on the later periods on the yield curve 
because it takes time for the new money to reach other prices in the economy.  
 
Figure 3.8 The Wicksell- and Fisher effect. Source: Cwik 2004 
When the opposing effects are combined we get the picture of figure 3.8. They even each 
other out on the longer rates. As the Fisher effect is weaker on the shorter rates, the Wicksell 
                                                 
29 Cwik (2004) 
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effect is more dominant in these stages. The net effect of money injections, all other things 
being equal, is therefore lower short rates and a rotated yield curve.   
The crunch phase and an inverted yield curve 
When explaining the upper-turning point of business cycles, theories center on either 
monetary or real factors as the major cause of the downturn. What makes capital-based 
macroeconomics significant is the ability to take both factors into account. Cwik refer to 
Robertson’s classic description of the onset of a recession,30 where two causes are identified: 
“deflationary shock” and shortage of savings. The capital-based view is that both these 
causes derive from the same underlying factor, which is malinvestment. Malinvestment is a 
disequilibrium which cannot be maintained. When the business cycle enters the crunch 
phase, the faith of the disequilibrium, it can play out as a credit crunch, a real resource 
crunch, or a combination of both. We will present them briefly.  
Credit crunch 
When the inflation or expected inflation is determined too high by the central bank, they will 
slow down the monetary policy – causing the short-term rates to go up. This makes the 
Wicksell effect dominate the short end of the yield curve. At the same time, due to higher 
short-term rates, the market expects future inflation to fall. The situation is depicted in figure 
3.9, where we see the new expectations nullify the Wicksell effect through the Fisher effect 
on the long-term rates. As a result, the yield curve tends to invert before recessions.  
 
Figure 3.9 Inverted yield curve. Source: Cwik 2004 
                                                 
30 Robertson (1959) 
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Hayek argues that the rate in which the money supply increases has to accelerate to maintain 
the level of malinvestment.
31
 The monetary authority is depended on surprising the market, 
by exceeding the expectations of future inflation. If it wasn’t for the crunches, this path 
would end in hyperinflation. When a monetary expansion occurs, the price levels rise not 
only unevenly due to the injection, but also as a result of entrepreneurs seeking funding for 
their malinvestments. The consequences are, thereby, made worse by the need for more 
cheap funding. The higher short-term rates will then bankrupt the holders of malinvestment. 
They were depended on resources that where not there. This starts the financial crises.  
Real resource crunch 
Capital-based macroeconomics offers also explanations of crunches when the monetary 
tightening is not policy-induced. With the malinvestmented boom, the entrepreneurs engage 
in unsustainable projects and the consumers increase their spending. There are not enough 
resources for both. In the search for resources, the entrepreneurs bid up wages and input 
prices relatively to the general price level. The acute need for resources drives up the short-
term rates – inverting the yield curve. Stabile investments are limited by the economy’s 
savings. The situation is made worse by the already increased consumption (decreased 
savings) as a consequence of the low short-term rates.  
Smaller firms are more dependent on short borrowing, and thus more sensitive to short-term 
rates. The long-term bonds have an inherited hedge against short-term fluctuations, and the 
larger firms’ access to these longer instruments gives them a clear advantage. Many larger 
firms also issue their own long-term bonds.  
Cwik finds that there has been an inverted or humped yield curve maximum five quarters 
before every recession since the mid-1950s. Five of the recessions where preceded by credit 
crunches; the two remaining where a result of real resource crunches.  
3.5 Criticism  
The Austrian school of economics does not follow the same scientific method that other 
schools do. The traditional methodology is about refuting, while the Austrian method is 
                                                 
31 Hayek (1969) 
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about proving. This is viewed as a major reason to why the Austrian economists are not 
more included in the mainstream debate.
32
   
John Quiggin, a Keynesian economist,
33
 attributes the impact of Austrian economics to the 
lack of intellectual competition for Mises and Hayek (in the early 19
th
 century). He also 
criticizes the lack of focus on labor in the business cycle, which he views as important.
34
 
Paul Krugman also argues that the Austrian framework cannot explain changes in 
employment over the business cycle.
35
  
With regards to policy, Milton Friedman argues that the Austrian economics’ implication 
would do a lot of harm. He specifically points to Hayek’s view that the market needs to 
correct itself and Murray Rothbard who advocated that it has been a mistake not letting the 
whole banking system collapse.
36
  
                                                 
32 Sautet (2005) 
33 John Quiggin (2012) 
34 Ibid. (2009) 
35 Krugman (1998) 
36 Friedman (1999) 
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4. Methodology and data 
Here we will present the methodology of our research. This will be structured around the 
subchapter of statistical methods and -tests. A brief section on our data will follow.  
4.1 Statistical methods 
We use three statistical methods, correlation, multiple regression analyses, and the Hodrick-
Prescott filter.  
Correlation analysis 
In order to investigate the relationships between certain variables, we will be conducting 
correlation analysis as a supplement to our graphical presentation. Correlation between two 
variables is measured by the Pearson product-moment, r, which varies between -1 and 1. A 
correlation of -1 indicates a perfectly negative correlation, while a value of +1 intuitively 
indicates a perfectly positive correlation. What is regarded as a strong correlation varies. 
However, a correlation ≤0.2 is seen as a weak correlation; 0.3-0.4 is seen as relatively 
strong; and a correlation ≥0.5 is regarded as strong.37 The correlation coefficients are given 
by the following equation (2): 
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(2) 
X and Y refer to the variables which the correlation coefficient is calculated for. The dividend 
in the expression equals the covariance between the variables, and the divisor equals the 
standard errors of the two variables multiplied.
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Multiple regression analysis 
Multiple regression analysis is a form of correlation. The purpose of this analysis is to 
investigate if a set of independent variables has an effect on a single dependent variable. The 
tool we will apply here is a type of multiple regression analysis known as the OLS 
                                                 
37 Johansen, Kristoffersen, & Tufte (2004) 
38 Wooldridge (2006) 
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regression. Here, we may choose whether or not we want to take into account the possibility 
of a variable influencing another variable after some time has passed, an effect often entitled 
lag.
39
 A dynamic model takes into account this effect; a static model does not. Out of the 
hypotheses we will be testing, the changes within the dependent variables could be 
somewhat lagged. However, we have chosen to apply a simultaneous static model, which 
does not consider this effect. We made this decision mainly due to the fact that our models 
did not produce any significantly different results after lag was introduced. If lagged 
variables were introduced, some of the models lost their explanatory power. Therefore, in 
order to be consistent, we chose a static model. However, not including lag might be 
considered a weakness since changes within some of the explanatory variables obviously 
occur before the changes in the dependent. The models are based on the following 
mathematical expression (3): 
 t = β0 + β1x1t + β2x2t + . . . + βnxnt + µ (3) 
Here, we find (Yt) being the dependent variable at time (t), explained by the changes within 
the independent variables (x1), (x2), ..., (xn) at time (t). The regression coefficient is defined 
by (β0), and the error term, which gives the variations within (Y) that the independent 
variables does not catch, is denoted by (µ). The OLS method tries to find the function of 
“best fit” that minimize the squared vertical distance between the observed values in the 
dataset and the responses predicted by linear approximation.
40
 The values of each single will 
either be in the form of “value less trend value”, or in the form of percentage deviations 
from trend. The denotation of the variables will be presented along with the results.  
Hodrick-Prescott filter 
In order to evaluate how the values in our time series deviate from their trend, we need to 
separate out the cyclical component. To do this we will apply an algorithm known as a HP-
filter,
41
 which allows us to estimate the trend component of each time series. This produces a 
set of smoothed values, i.e. a trend, which can be used in calculating the actual data’s 
deviation of said trend. The filter is expressed through equation (4):  
                                                 
39 Gujarati (2003) 
40 University of Strathclyde 
41 Grytten (2012) 
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In the equation (  ) refers to the observed value at time (t), while (d) refers to the trend 
component at time (t-1), (t), and (t+1). The first term of the equation is the sum of the 
squared deviations of the observed value from the trend.
42
 The term is squared as to provide 
negative and positive deviations with the same weight. The second term of the equation is an 
expression of the variance within the trend.   is the smoothing parameter which is the weight 
one chooses for minimizing deviations between trend and observed value. A lambda value 
( ), that increases indefinitely, will produce a proximate linear trend. The trend can thusly 
remain flexible by choosing a suitable lambda value.
43
 
What is regarded as a “suitable” value for lambda varies greatly based on aspects such as 
country of analysis, and the sample frequency within the time series. When applying the 
filter for annual data, Ahumada and Garegani indicates that a  =100 would be appropriate.44 
For quarterly series, a  =1600 was found to be suitable by Kydland & Prescot,45 and for the 
monthly we use a  =14400.46 The time series that we will analyze are predominantly 
quarterly data, we will thus apply a  =1600 for all our three economies. However, Statistic 
Norway uses a lambda of 40 000 for Norway,
47
 which we also will apply in some graphical 
analyses.
48
 Since seasonal variation could contaminate the cyclical signal,
49
 we have mainly 
chosen seasonally adjusted time series. 
The strength of the HP-filter lies in its easy use,
50
 and intuitiveness. Nonetheless, since the 
filter is two-sided – implying that for a given point in time, it uses both backwards and 
forwards observations to calculate the trend value – the filter will become one-sided as it 
approaches both ends of the series. The greater the  , the greater this problem will become.51  
                                                 
42
 Bjørnland, Brubakk, & Jore (2004)  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ahumada & Garegnani (1999) 
45 Kydland & Prescott (1990)  
46 Grytten (2012) 
47 Benedictow & Johansen (2005) 
48 I.e. the analyses of 5.2.1 The Austrian perspective and 7.1.3 Norway – if nothing else is mentioned.  
49 Maravall & Río (2001)  
50 Bjørnland, Brubakk, & Jore (2004) 
51 Ibid. 
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4.2 Statistical tests 
Of statistical tests we will include the F-test, T-test, and the Durbin-Watson. These are to 
evaluate the results of our multiple regression analyses. Followed briefly by how we measure 
deviations of HP-trend.  
F-test  
The F-test is a statistical procedure that can be applied to investigate if the independent 
variables (x) influence the dependent (Y), and explain the changes within this. The F-test 
operates with the null hypothesis that every coefficient has a value of zero. This would imply 
that none of the independent variables has any explanatory power on the dependent (Y). 
Elevated F-levels implies that the null hypothesis should be rejected.  The test is based on 
the expression (5): 
  
  (     )
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 (5) 
Where (  ) refers to the regressions unadjusted explanatory power, (k) equals the number of 
explanatory variables within the model, and (n) the number of observations.  
T-test  
A T-test helps us determine whether each independent variable (x) exerts a significant 
influence on the dependent variable (Y). The test operates with the null hypothesis that the 
related independent variable (x) has no effect on the dependent variable, and that the 
coefficient is zero. The P-value of this test states the possibility of discovering a similar 
value to the coefficient, given the null hypothesis being true. A small p-value indicates that 
the null hypothesis should be rejected. The mathematical expression (6) for the test is:  
   
 ̅   
 
√ 
 (6) 
 ̅ represents the observed variable value, and   is the value assumed in the null hypothesis 
that gives a coefficient of zero. s is the variance and n is the number of observations in the 
test. 
Durbin-Watson  
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When using time series, one can often come across the problem of autocorrelation. This 
occurs when a systematic pattern develops within the order of residuals et, that makes the 
residual of observation t contain information about that of observation t+1. Such an event 
can come about if, e.g., relevant factors have not been included in the model, or if the data 
follows cycles. The occurrence of autocorrelation implies a systematic pattern in the data 
which breaks with one the assumptions made in the OLS method. We estimate 
autocorrelation through testing (7): 
   
∑ (        )
  
 
∑   
  
 
 (7) 
Here,    refers to the estimated residual value at time t. A low DW value (<2) indicates 
positive first order autocorrelation, whilst elevated levels (>2) indicates a negative first order 
autocorrelation. In order to correct for this effect, we have chosen to calculate a HP-filter 
(Trendt) for the observations within our time series (Ot). The values that the HP-filter 
produces will be subtracted from the original variable values (Ot –Trendt) resulting in the 
measure Ct. Lastly the find the percentage deviation from trend by calculating equation (8).
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We will then apply these deviations when conducting the regression. 
    
  
  
   (8) 
4.3 Data 
Because we are using a very broad specter of data, we have chosen to present it as we go to 
keep the discussion easier to follow. Most data are gathered through Macrobond, Thomson 
Reuters’ Datastream, and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ website.53 The data from 
Macrobond and Datastream usually source back to official, high quality, sources like Federal 
Reserve,
54
 European Central Bank,
55
 and Statistics Norway.
56
 The data is chosen based on 
our theoretical framework, i.e. we choose data we see fit to shed empirical light on the 
theories. Also due to our broad focus and the necessity of limitations, we have decided to 
make these choices as we go, to keep a compact structure.  
                                                 
52 Grytten (2012) 
53 Macrobond; Thomson Reuters and; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (a) 
54 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (a) 
55 European Central Bank (a) 
56 Statistics Norway 
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5. Pre-08 government interference 
In this first chapter of empirical analyses we will, with our two theoretical frameworks, 
throw light on our first research question: Did government intervention contribute to the 
housing bubble of 2008? Of our three chapters of analyses, this first lays the foundation for 
the following two. We will structure this chapter basically around fiscal policy and monetary 
policy. Fiscal policy will be assessed in light of our Austrian framework, while monetary 
policy – which is our main focus – will be assessed with both perspectives of the Austrian- 
and Minskian school of economics. Some empirical arguments overlap, and will be cut short 
in the latter discussion. Both subchapters, on fiscal- and monetary policies, will start with a 
brief qualitative overview.  
5.1 Fiscal policies 
The euro area has no common fiscal policy. Although they share currency, their fiscal 
policies are divergent. The qualitative segment of fiscal policy is therefore going to be 
focused mainly on USA and Norway. All details on the Norwegian and American budgets 
are gathered from the website of the Norwegian government
57
 and the Federal Reserve 
Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER).
58
 The outcome of fiscal policy is – to a 
large degree – seen in the data gathered for our later discussion on monetary policy.  We 
will, therefore, put a large emphasis on intentions and politics in this presentation of fiscal 
policy, studying national budgets of USA and Norway.  
In Norwegian fiscal policy “handlingsregelen” is quite central. It could be understood as a 
“rule of action” which provides a guideline for the use of oil revenue in the national budget. 
The Norwegian government saves its revenue related to oil in the Government Pension Fund. 
“Handlingsregelen” dictates how much money is to be taken out of this fund, and into the 
budget. The limit is set to be at the expected real return of the fund by the entrance of the 
fiscal year, which again is estimated to be four percent.
59
 The use may appear to increase in 
NOK while declining in percentage, which is due to the funds continuously increasing size.  
                                                 
57 The Norwegian Government 
58 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (b) 
59 Finansdepartementet (2001) 
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The period, before the housing bubble, starts in 2001 with the establishment of 
“handlingsregelen”.60 It’s considered a neutral fiscal policy. USA experiences its lowest 
unemployment rate in 30 years. Under President Clinton they have made a surplus and are 
paying off debt. The future is viewed very optimistically, as expressed in the federal budget 
for 2001: "As the debt begins to reverse course and head downward, we have an 
extraordinary opportunity to make America debt free by 2013."
61
 In the planning of both 
countries’ budget for 2002 the IT-bubble is not relevant yet. Corrected for oil, the structural 
deficit on GDP trend for mainland Norway is 2.3 percent, 26 billion NOK. USA is focusing 
on moderate government growth, tax relief and debt reduction.  
Both countries budgets for 2003 is, however, much more dramatic. USA is facing lots of 
fiscal stress, and a war is initiated as an answer to the terrorist attack on September 11
th
, 
2001. The American budget is turning more expansive and away from its debt reducing path. 
Norway is affected mainly indirectly through stress in the US and European markets, with its 
strong and “less competitive” NOK.  
For the budget of 2004, Norway is planning a larger structural deficit, corrected for oil: 50.7 
billion NOK (calculated to be 74.3 billion the year after). Norway is also facing increasing 
unemployment. The fiscal policy is, however, considered neutral overall. USA provides 
further tax cuts in this fiscal year. The American spending continues to increase on security 
related to wartime, while focusing on making cuts on non-security programs. Deficit for the 
2005 American fiscal year is estimated to be $521 billion, 4.5 percent of GDP (but came in 
109 billion lower).  
By 2006, Norway has a structural deficit, corrected for oil, of 65.9 billion NOK – which 
comes to 4.6 percent of the GDP trend of mainland Norway. The economic outlook is 
considered stronger, and the fiscal policy neutral. This picture leads to the aim of lowering 
the use of oil revenue. In the 2008 budget, Norway plans to bring the spending from the 
Pension Fund down, 7 billion below “handlingsregelen”.  
USA has, in 2006, increased overall defense spending by 41 percent since 2001. In 2007 the 
American markets experience strong growth, but the government still carries a deficit, 
estimated to $354 billion, 2.6 percent of GDP – which they also focus on reducing in 2008. 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 U.S. Government (2000, p. 13)  
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Both economies end this period with strong growth and low unemployment. However, they 
are both in deficit as they face the next period, which is far more dramatic.  
The euro area has a similar story, although diverse. They had projects working towards 
financial integration between the member countries. Through EU they implemented a series 
of regulations, e.g. the Capital Requirement Directive of June 2006.
62
 
In USA, the subprime mortgages were central in the housing bubble, and much debated 
afterwards. Despite this, we will not pay it much attention. It is a major factor in explaining 
the events of the housing bubble, yes; but we argue it is a secondary. It was made a problem 
due to other primary events, like monetary expansion. It was a part of the bubble, but it was 
defiantly not the source. A meteorologist would not pay much attention to the leaves the 
wind blows, but rather why it does. For our purpose of looking ahead, previous blown leaves 
are not going to tell us much about where the wind will blow next time. 
Figure 5.1 below depicts all regions deficit, annually from 2000 to 2013, with an estimate of 
2014 and 2015. The data is from the European Commission and gathered through 
Macrobond. The Norwegian data is not corrected for oil revenue. After the IT-bubble, we 
observe that USA and the euro area have been in more or less deficit.  
 
Figure 5.1 Surplus and deficit 
                                                 
62 European Central Bank (2007) 
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5.1.1 The Austrian perspective 
We will use Garrison’s framework for deficit finance to assess the financial situation before 
the housing bubble. Deficit finance initiates a shift, from tax-financed to deficit-financed 
spending. The theory is assuming that the spending is outside the national economy. This 
makes it applicable in the case of USA, due to its war time spending. For our assessment, it 
doesn’t matter whether the war is legitimate or not. The economic consequences are almost 
the same once the war is initiated, at least on short term.
63
 For the euro area and Norway, the 
applicability of the model is more segmented. Both regions participated in Afghanistan in 
this period, but to a lesser degree than USA. Because of Norway’s special case of oil covered 
deficit, we will exclude it from this discussion. The Norwegian case is not compatible with 
our theoretical framework in this instance. The applicability of the model is strongest for 
USA, with a deficit-financed war. For the euro area, it is applicable to the extent that they 
participate in the war, and to the degree their governments spend funds outside their 
economy. 
The regions (USA and the euro area) issues debt and put an upward pressure on the interest 
rate, which makes a positive demand shift in the market for loanable funds. With the higher 
interest rate the private demand for loans is lower, as it is still given by the initial demand 
curve. We get higher consumption which again twists the Hayekian triangle in favor of the 
later stages. The upward pressure on the interest rate gives the central banks the opportunity 
to print even more money within their target rates. The policy induced lower rates was 
“supposed to” be represented by saving – higher consumption is in this context over-
consumption. The policy of deficit finance is maybe more dangerous here, where it is not 
seen. The motion of the natural interest rate is hidden behind the effective. With a given rate, 
deficit finance also allows for greater monetary expansions. This could contribute to even 
more malinvestments. Fiscal policy may be more influential than first anticipated.  
5.2 Monetary policies 
Monetary policy is our main argument when discussing the government’s role in the housing 
bubble.  We will assess the housing bubble with the perspective of the Austrian school of 
                                                 
63 Ludwig von Mises argues that a legit war is worth fighting for the nation’s future security (Garrison 2001) 
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economics, followed by the Minskian. First, we will present a brief overview of the three 
central banks and their practice.  
The Federal Reserve (Fed) is responsible for monetary policy in the United States. The Fed’s 
mandate is to “maintain long-run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates 
commensurate with the country’s long-run potential to increase production, so as to promote 
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest 
rates”.64,65 
Within the Fed, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is responsible for making and 
implementing policy decisions. They achieve their above-mentioned goals by influencing the 
federal funds rate through open market operations, the discount rate, and the reserve 
requirement placed upon credit institutions. Open market operations are done to align the 
inter-bank rate (federal funds effective rate) with the federal funds target rate, through selling 
and purchasing securities.
66
 We consider this tool most relevant for our period of analysis, 
and thus will not be discussing the other types. Please note that for the remainder of this 
paper we will use the abbreviation Fed when we are referring to the FOMC.  
The European Central Bank (ECB) has conducted monetary policy for the euro area since 
1999. Their primary objective is to achieve price stability for the members of the monetary 
union.
67,68
 To achieve price stability, the ECB attempts to maintain year-on-year increases in 
the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) close to two percent over the medium 
term. They attempt to accomplish this through: 1) open market operations; 2) interest 
charged on the standing facilities, and; 3) the minimum reserve requirements for credit 
institutions.
69
 These tools correlate well with the ones used by the Fed, with main 
refinancing operations being the most relevant to our thesis.  
The monetary policy goal of Norges Bank (NB) is to – over time – establish consumer price 
inflation near 2.5 percent, and a contributing to stabilizing output and employment.
70
 As 
with the two others, they accomplish this by targeting the inter-bank rate. This rate is to stay 
                                                 
64 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1977) 
65 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (c)  
66 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013b) 
67 Gerdesmeier, Mongelli, & Roffia (2007) 
68 Claussen, Jonassen, & Langbraaten (2007) 
69 European Central Bank (b) 
70 Norges Bank (2008b) 
 46 
close to the sight deposit rate, which is NB’s target interest rate. Through fixed rate loans 
and fixed rate deposits, NB can push the target rate in the desired direction. NB also applies 
the two other tools as the previously mentioned central banks. 
In order to point out how monetary policy had the potential of contribution to the housing 
bubble, we will now present a brief overview of the intentions held and decisions made by 
each central bank. An analysis of the consequences of said policy will be conducted in the 
following sub-chapters. Our focus will naturally be on the actions of the Fed, since policy in 
the three regions generally followed the same pattern.  
5.2.1 The Austrian perspective  
We will use the boom and bust application of Garrison’s model in assessing the housing 
bubble form an Austrian perspective. We would like to start by considering the three 
assumptions that the model is based on, i.e.: 1) unchanging intertemporal preferences; 2) a 
monetary authority controls the money supply, and; 3) that the supply of loanable funds 
include funds made available by the central banks as well as savings. First, we regard 
intertemporal preferences as secondary to monetary policy. Preferences manifest itself deep 
in the culture. We can observe different insensitivity in consumption and saving between 
USA and Japan, but we find no signs of significant shifts inside one economy. Of course 
there might be some changes in preferences over time, but for our period of focus – the 21st 
century – we hold monetary policy as a primary influence in the allocation of resources. 
Second, with regards to the monetary authority’s control over the money supply, it is partly 
true. The central banks have a monopoly on the nation’s currency, and thereby the monetary 
base. However, M2 is by definition also affected by other factors – as economic growth.71 
The Fed sets the base and the banks make the multiplication. We find it safe to say that the 
central banks influence the money supply. Third, we will argue that funds made available by 
the central banks are in fact increasing the supply of loanable funds – it is the source.  
The housing bubble is going to be assessed in the following six steps, which is derived from 
the boom and bust situation in figure 3.7. All gaps are measured as percent deviation of HP-
trend.  
1. Link between money supply and interest rate  
                                                 
71 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (b) 
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2. Credit gap 
3. Production gap 
4. Consumption gap 
5. Housing projects 
6. Inverted yield curves and credit crunch 
Link between money supply and interest rate  
The business cycle starts out with a monetary expansion by the central banks. Austrian 
economists argue that lower rates are only an effect of increased money supply, as a positive 
shift in supply equals a lower price on the commodity. Due to the complexity of M2, its 
relationship to the interest rate is hard to find quantitatively. Below in figure 5.2, we have 
put together M2’s percent deviations of HP-trend with the US federal funds target rate from 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The data on M2 is gathered from Federal Reserve 
through Macrobond, and seasonally adjusted. The HP-filter is conducted from 1959, so there 
is no starting point error in the depict period, which is monthly from 01.2000 to 09.2013. We 
find it more accurate to use percent deviations of trend than the actual numbers because the 
trend movements in M2 are largely guided by expectations.  
 
Figure 5.2 Federal funds target rate and M2 
We find a negative correlation between the two by -0.322, which is considered relatively 
strong
72
 – proposing a negative relationship. The influence of GDP needs to be taken into 
account when discussing changes in M2. However, if we look at the booming period of 
                                                 
72 Johannesen, Kristoffersen, & Tufte (2004) 
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2005-2007, M2’s trend deviation is not at its heights. If GDP growth puts an upward 
pressure on M2 then we should experience higher trend deviations of M2 in the early years 
(2001 to 2004) and lower deviations in the following booming period – if we correct M2 for 
GDP. If this is true, our correlation of -0.322 could be even more negative. The red line of 
M2 deviations is more often above its zero percent line in recessions and recoveries, and 
below in well-known booming periods – suggesting the influence of countercyclical policies.  
The data confirm the boom bust model of lowered interest rate, down to one percent, at a 
time where the percent deviations of trend peaked at 1.9 percent in 08.2003, prior to the 
housing bubble. This should offset a credit expansion.  
Credit gap 
We are still discussing shifts and consequences in the market for loanable funds. From here 
we will include the euro area and Norway. To see how the monetary injections and 
historically low interest rates for all regions
73
 affected the credit markets with regard to the 
housing bubble, we will first take a look at private non-financial corporations’ credit 
development followed by households. The former have – in figure 5.3 – data from 01.1980 
for USA and Norway. For the euro area we could only find from the later 90’s.74  
 
Figure 5.3 Credit gap – Private non-financial corporations 
                                                 
73 Appendix: Target Interest Rates 
74 “The euro was introduced in 1999.” European Central Bank (d) 
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The series of figure 5.3 are quarterly, ends on 01.2013, and are gathered from Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. All regions experience a significant credit expansion for non-
financial corporations, peaking around 2008. The numbers where the closest we could find 
to in part represent the firms engaging in housing projects. To the degree that these data 
speak for this specific sector, it suggests a credit expansion in all regions.  
The entrepreneurs is not the only one accumulating debt in a boom, the buyers do as well. 
Figure 5.4 on households’ credit gap may be more precise in this assessment. The 
households are a more direct link to the housing bubble than the general non-financial 
corporations. The credit expansion is made even clearer at this point. Norway is a special 
case, with its housing bubble in the early 90’s. Followed by monetary expansion and lower 
interest rates, we do find credit expansion in all regions. The data in figure 5.4 is of the same 
source as of figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.4 Credit gap – Households 
Production gap 
The consequences – of the discussed – take form in the PPF curve. The signal of lower rates, 
by the shift to S+∆MC in figure 3.7, calls for over-investment. At the same time, the 
consumers are still represented by S, where the now lower rates discourage saving and favors 
consumption. Burning the candle in both ends, we are outside the sustainable area of the PPF 
curve. This phenomenon of overproduction is best illustrated by production gap, in figure 
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5.5. Our data series
75
 starts in 01.1980 for USA and Norway, and 01.1995 for the euro area. 
It ends in 04.2013 for the euro area and Norway, and 07.2013 for USA. All are quarterly 
data on GDP.  
 
Figure 5.5 Production gap 
The production gap of USA peaks already in 2007, the euro area peaks in the early 2008, and 
Norway peaks in mid-2008. For all regions, the peaks are significant to the rest of our time 
series. The same mechanisms appear to be very strong in Norway prior to the Housing 
bubble in the early 90’s, but there is also a noticeable peak before the current crisis.  
To elaborate on the forces that cause unsustainable production we want to include the 
consumption gap. Together with housing starts that are going to follow, these forces are what 
constitute the production gap or the unsustainable production outside the PPF curve.  
Consumption gap 
The data we found on consumption differ from each other in kind and time period.
76
 All are 
gathered through Macrobond,
77
 and presented in figure 5.6.
78
 
                                                 
75 The data for USA is from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, for the euro area is form Eurostat, and for Norway is from 
Statistics Norway. All are gathered through Macrobond.  
76 For USA we have seasonally adjusted personal consumption expenditures, excluding food and energy prices, monthly 
from 01.1980 to 08.2013. For the euro area we have households’ credit for consumption, monthly from 09.1997 to 09.2013. 
And, for Norway we have seasonally adjusted households’ final consumption expenditure, quarterly from 01.1980 to 
04.2013. However, we only depict the data after 1997.  
77 The American numbers are from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; the euro area from ECB; and, the Norwegian from 
Statistics Norway.  
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Figure 5.6 Consumption gap 
The American consumption gap is not dramatic, but it is positive and the highest since the 
80’s in our analysis. Much of the same is true for the euro area. To explain the positive 
deviations after 2010, we point out that the trend for the euro areas consumption turned 
diminishing – hence, making the later deviations more positive.  The picture is somewhat 
clearer in the case of Norway. Again, the Garrisons boom and bust model seems to really 
capture the old Norwegian housing bubble.  
The above discussion on consumption strengthens our application of capital-based 
macroeconomics. To complete the cycle we need to discuss over- and malinvestment. In the 
case of a housing bubble, we find measures from the early stage of construction relevant for 
them both – especially for malinvestment.  
Housing projects 
For housing projects we have done HP-trend analyses, depicted in the appendix.
79
 Despite 
their diversity in sort, the fact that all the series are from the early stages of production make 
them useful for our purpose.  
All regions show peaks around 2006, followed by major downturns. These clearly represent 
the bust of the early stages of production in the Hayekian triangle. We also notice how the 
                                                                                                                                                      
78 The values of the euro area and Norway are divided by ten to make them more compatible with that of USA.  
79 Appendix: Housing starts – USA (A); Housing starts – euro area, and; Housing starts – Norway  
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series peak before all other measures we have assessed. This is a good example on how the 
problems start at malinvestments.  
Inverted yield curves and credit crunch 
With Cwiks dissertation taken into account, we look at the American yield curves
80
 in figure 
5.7. NBER recessions
81
 are highlighted in grey.  
 
Figure 5.7 Yield curves – USA 
We see a clear inversion prior to the housing bubble’s bust. The Federal Reserve started 
reacting to higher housing prices in 2004/2005 by increasing the interest rate. This led the 
yield curve to invert. The three month bill inverted against the ten year bond from July 2006 
to June 2007, giving out a huge warning signal.  
We find capital-based macroeconomics to be very applicable to the housing bubble of 2008. 
It offers a good explanation of the underlying factors between the boom and the bust. To 
broaden the link between monetary policy and crises, that we advocate, we will follow up 
with an assessment in the Minskian perspective.  
                                                 
80 Figure made in Datastream, from Thomson Reuters.  
81 National Bureau of Economic Research (2010) (NBER) defines recessions as the period between the peak and the trough 
of business cycles.  
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5.2.2 The Minskian perspective 
Since we already assessed the housing bubble from the perspective of the Austrian school, 
our choice to include Minsky’s theories is one made primarily out of desire to illustrate that 
other perspectives could result in the same conclusion. This subchapter will include a 
qualitative assessment of Grytten’s model of “Minskian stages”, followed by quantitative 
analyses. 
After the IT-bubble busted, business and consumer confidence fell.
82
 Business credit also 
went below trend levels
83
 and would decline until it flattened out in mid-2004. The Fed 
responded swiftly by lowering the target rate.  
Stage 1: Displacement 
In the first stage of the model one can witness a debt expansion due to increased confidence, 
combined with the creation of new money, and/or wealth owners’ portfolio diversification. 
In the US, as the effects of the IT-bubble wore off, the economy grew again. Confidence 
increased, and the decline in business credit flattened out before it started growing again. 
The Fed target rate had remained at a significantly low level for some time
84
 and M2 stayed 
mainly above trend from mid-2002 until the start of 2005.
85
 The same tendencies could also 
be seen within the euro area. In Norway however, the effects would present themselves 
sometime after the US and the EA. The NB target rate was maintained at a comparatively 
high level for almost three years since the Fed started lowering their target rate.  
Already here, we can see how Minsky’s concepts start presenting themselves. After a 
significant downturn, confidence grows, and when this happens, a credit expansion starts 
taking place due to the creation of new money. The effects can be seen to present themselves 
somewhat slower in Norway.  
Stage 2: Overtrading 
In the second stage of the model, growing profitability expectations leads firms to expand 
their production, and economic activity increases. Credit is still increasing as businesses and 
                                                 
82 Appendix: Business- and Consumer Confidence  
83 Figure 5.Error! Main Document Only. Credit gap – Private non-financial corporations 
84 Appendix: Targets Interest Rates 
85 Appendix: M2  
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consumers in financing purchases use it. Profitability expectations surpass real value, and the 
economy enters into an exponential phase of growth (Grytten 2003).
86
 
In 2003, the Fed made it clear that low interest rates provided an additional boost in 
household spending, by reducing borrowing costs for new purchases of houses. The low 
interest rates also facilitated a refinancing on mortgages, and thereby an upward pressure on 
housing prices.
87
 Housing prices and real-GDP shot above its trend levels towards the end of 
2004.
88
 By the end of 2005 US housing prices, real-GDP, confidence, residential 
construction and business fixed investment were significantly above trend levels.
89
  
The same tendencies that one could observe in the US, were also presenting themselves in 
Norway and the euro area. The difference was primarily related to the US economy grew 
somewhat earlier than the two others. It’s also worth noting that the Norwegian business 
credit did not surpass trend levels before 2007, an effect that might be attributed to NB not 
lowering its target rate before 2003 (two years later than the Fed and the ECB).  
Again, we see movements within the economy that can be explained by Minsky. Banks had 
easy access to Fed funds for a while. Confidence is rising, and consumers are increasing 
their debt-financed purchases of, in this case, housing. This helps drive prices upwards and 
businesses (especially construction firms) respond to these signals by expanding their 
operations (fixed investments and residential construction) to meet demand. All this, 
accompanied by easy access to credit, helps fuel the “machinery”, and M2 is expanding as 
Minsky foretold. The economy is growing and for a while resides above trend levels, which 
is signified by real-GDP. The Fed responds by raising the target rate in order to prevent 
inflation.  
Stage 3: Monetary expansion 
During a monetary expansion a “growing demand leads to an increased demand for money 
and credit, which increases the money supply. The increased demand for money and credit 
leads to an increased demand for products. At this stage, the confidence and the easy access 
to funds contribute to creating a financial bubble.”90 
                                                 
86 Grytten (2003) 
87 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2004, p. 5)  
88 Appendix: Real-GDP 
89 Appendix: Real-GDP; Business- and Household Confidence; Business Fixed Investment, Residential Construction, and; 
Housing Prices.  
90 Grytten (2003, p. 92) (authors translation) 
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From 2005, the trend of the previous stage continued. Credit kept on expanding rapidly, in 
spite of the rapid increases in the federal funds target rate, and real-GDP grew well above 
trend levels. However, around mid-2006 residential construction peaked, and started falling, 
which led to a fall in employment within that industry. The Fed noticed this development; 
however, they still felt that the economy in general was in good shape.
91
 
After housing prices peaked in 2007, prices started declining somewhat sharply – which led 
people to have trouble getting their houses sold to a comfortable price. As has become 
commonly known, some households took on mortgages even though their ability to pay back 
was limited. At first, this did not prove to be a problem since housing prices were 
continuously raising. However, as housing prices started falling, and the economy in general 
was cooling down due to the constraints put forward by the contraction in residential 
construction.
92
 Several households had trouble serving their loans. For some, default became 
the only option. This reduction in confidence and investments is the first sign of a crisis. 
Stage 4 and 5: Revulsion and Discredit 
In the fourth stage of the model, the positive financial bubble that was created by monetary 
growth surpassing real economic growth, will eventually burst. As of figure 2.1, reduced 
optimism pushes investment down, while reducing asset prices.  
The crisis that took place within the housing market had far reaching consequences due to 
the speculative endeavors that had taken place amongst large financial market players. On 
September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put into conservatorship,
93
 throwing 
financial markets into panic. Two weeks later, Merryl Lynch had been sold, Lehman 
Brothers had filed for bankruptcy, and AIG had been given a loan of $85 billion by the Fed. 
These inconsistencies contributed to the decline below fundamental values – and the 
economy reached the fifth stage. 
In the fifth stage, a negative bubble is created by economic growth falling below its natural 
path.
94
 Close to every indicator would fall below trend not long after the fall of 2008.  
What is interesting with this situation is the fact that residential construction reached its peak 
some time before consumer confidence. This suggests that early stages of production are 
                                                 
91 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007a)  
92 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007b)  
93 Bodie, Kane, & Marcus (2011, p. 49) 
94 Grytten (2003) 
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primary to confidence. This again implies that the Austrian framework could have stronger 
explanatory power than the confidence-focused theories. At least it supports our choice to 
use two theoretical frameworks.  
We find the five stages to fit the housing bubble. Due to the wide ramifications of the 
turmoil in the financial markets, Norway and the euro area were also affected.  The euro area 
followed much of the same pattern as the US. In Norway however, residential construction 
would not fall below trend before the beginning of 2008, and GDP experienced a dramatic 
fall below trend levels first in 2010. As of consumer confidence, the fall did not have a too 
lengthy effect on Norwegians.   
Quantitative testing of model assumptions 
We will now present some multiple regression analysis that we have conducted to test 
whether or not the assumptions made by Minsky is valid within our three economies. The 
tests are shown in table 5.1. 
Hypothesis: 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
1 
Increase in 
Household Credit 
Decrease in Target 
Interest Rate 
Household 
Confidence 
  
2 
Increase in Business 
Credit 
Decrease in Target 
Interest Rate 
Business 
Confidence 
Household 
Confidence 
Household Credit 
3 
Increase in Business 
Fixed Investment 
Increase in 
Business Credit 
Decrease in Target 
Interest Rate 
Business 
Confidence 
Household 
Confidence 
4 
Increase in 
Residential 
Construction 
Increase in 
Business Credit 
Decrease in Target 
Interest Rate 
Business 
Confidence 
Household 
Confidence 
5 
Increase in Housing 
Prices 
Increase in 
Household Credit 
Decrease in Target 
Interest Rate 
Household 
Confidence 
 
Table 5.1 Hypotheses 
The regressions have some weaknesses and should therefore be taken as a supplement to the 
graphical analysis earlier in this chapter. One statistical weakness is the presence of positive 
autocorrelation in as good as every test we have conducted – as indicated by the Durbin-
Watson (DW) tests. Autocorrelation is present even though we have processed the data by 
calculating an HP-filter for every single time series, and applied those values to adjust the 
actual data.  
The time series is also shorter than ideal. We operate using quarterly data due to the fact that 
most of our relevant variables are only measured once each quarter. This however, leads us 
to having even fewer observations to study. We have made an attempt of finding data that 
runs back to the 1980’s which ideally would provide us with around 130 observations. 
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Unfortunately, for the most part we operate with around 80 observations. We don’t have any 
observations for the euro area before 01.1999 (establishment of the ECB). We will therefore 
not give the test from this region any attention; however, the results could give some 
illustrational value.  
We have also decided to apply a static model, where no lag is included. This could have 
been done differently, but for the most part including lagged variables did not increase the 
models explanatory power. Therefore, to keep the results consistent - and not further reduce 
our already limited number of samples - no lag was included.  
For the t-tests, we have chosen a 95 percent confidence interval. If we wanted to better 
explain the changes in e.g. housing prices, other variables could perhaps have been included. 
However, since our goal is to examine government interference, we have chosen to keep the 
number of independents as small as possible. Different methods have been applied in 
processing the data.
95
 
Hypothesis 1: Household credit 
Here, we wanted to investigate further the theory that households take on more credit as their 
confidence grows, and target interest rates are low. This is expressed as follow:  
HouseholdCreditt = β0 + β1TargetInterestt + β2HouseholdConfidencet + µ (9) 
We want to make it clear that we understand that the target rate only affects consumers 
through banks’ lending decisions. However, as already stated, the target rates function as a 
tool of making credit more available to the public. 
The data for household credit have been gathered from Bank for International Settlements:
96
 
the monthly target interest rates from the respective central banks (Fed, ECB, NB),
97
 and; 
                                                 
95 Some results in our tables will carry the following marks: 
* Calculated using variables unprocessed observations  
** Calculated using the variables percent-deviations from trend ( = 
           
        
   ) 
*** Calculated using the variables unprocessed observations on change-from (   (
      
        
)    ) 
**** Calculated using the unprocessed variables’ actual deviations from trend (              –        ) 
96 Bank for International Settlements 
97 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (c); European Central Bank (c), and; Norges Bank (a) 
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household confidence from The Conference Board,
98
 the European Commission,
99
 and 
Finance Norway.
100
 The results are presented in table 5.2. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Household Credit* 
 
 
Region: USA EA NOR 
  
Stand. Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Target Interest -.221
*** -1.737 
(.086) 
-.497* 
-3.843 
(.000) 
.257*** 
-2.599 
(.011) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Household Confidence .367
** 
2.886 
(.005) 
-.257** 
-1.988 
(.052) 
-.276**** 
2.414 
(.018) 
 
Adjust. R-squared .076 .194 .164 
 
DW 0.170 .096 .306 
 
F-Test (Sig.) 4.204 (.019) 7.613 (.001) 8.920 (.000) 
Table 5.2 Hypothesis 1 
For this, and the following hypothesis we are testing, we want to see negative significant 
coefficients for the target interest rates, and positive coefficients for the other variables. In 
table 5.2 however, our findings are somewhat mixed. The ideal pattern only presents itself in 
the US, where target interest rates are just above the 95 percent confidence level (>0.05).  
Also, for the US, the explanatory power of the model (AR
2
) is virtually non-existent. In 
Norway, the opposite result was found.  
Hypothesis 2: Business credit 
Next, we want to investigate if rising household credit, fueled by an increase in confidence, 
will transfer into businesses becoming more confident and thus expanding their operations 
through applying credit. To test this, we have formulated the following model: 
BusinessCreditt = β0 + β1FedTargett + β2BusinessConfidencet  
+ β3HouseholdConfidencet + β4HouseholdCreditt + µ 
(10) 
The newly added variables consist of business credit and business confidence. We have 
gathered the business credit data from the Bank for International Settlements,
101
 and the 
business confidence data from Fed
102
 and Statistics Norway.
103
 Results are in table 5.3. 
                                                 
98 The Conference Board 
99 European Commission (2013) 
100 Finans Norge 
101 Bank of International Settlements 
102 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (d) 
103 Statistics Norway 
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Dependent 
Variable: 
Business Credit 
 
 
Region: USA EA NOR 
  
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Target Interest -.501
*** 
-6.729 
(.000) 
.790* 
6.829 
(.000) 
-.338*** 
-3.803 
(.000) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Household 
Confidence 
.171* 
2.340 
(.022) 
.056** .427 (.671) -.287**** 
-3.019 
(.003) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Household Credit .558
**** 
8.115 
(.000) 
.549**** 
5.169 
(.000) 
.369**** 
3.897 
(.000) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Business 
Confidence 
-.184**** 
-2.583 
(.012) 
-.376**** 
-3.014 
(.004) 
-.099**** 
-1.101 
(.274) 
 
Adjust. R-squared .638 .500 .367 
 
DW .289 .313 .520 
 
F-Test (Sig.) 35.321 (.000) 14.724 (.000) 12.723 (.000) 
Table 5.3 Hypothesis 2 
The hypothesis states that target interest rates should have negative coefficients, and the 
three others should be positive. Here, the AR
2’s should be taken with a grain of salt since 
they are tremendously large for the US and Norway. However, we can see significant 
negative coefficients for the “target”-variable in the same countries. This indicates an actual 
connection between falling target rates and increasing business debt. As for business 
confidence, a result contrary to the hypothesis was found for the US. In Norway, the same 
coefficient gives an insignificant result, rendering us unable to make any conclusions as to 
whether business confidence influence business credit in that region.  
Hypothesis 3: Business fixed investment 
After investigating the influence confidence and consumer credit has on firms’ debt-ratio, we 
now want to study the hypothesis that credit growth, along with increased general 
confidence, leads to businesses increasing their fixed investments. We have here formulated 
the following model: 
BusinessFixedInvestmentt = β0 + β1BusinessCreditt + β2FedTargett  
+ β3BusinessConfidencet + β4HouseholdConfidencet + µ 
(11) 
We gathered the data for business fixed investment from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis,
104
 from the European Commission,
105
 and from SSB.
106
 It is presented in table 5.4. 
                                                 
104 Bureau of Economic Analysis (2013) 
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Dependent 
Variable: 
Increase in Business Fixed 
Investment  
 
Region: USA EA NOR 
  
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Target Interest .665
*** 
7.867 
(.000) 
.402* 
3.015 
(.004) 
.300*** 
2.698 
(.009) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Business Confidence .116
*** 
1.724 
(.089) 
.475**** 
3.322 
(.002) 
.196* 
1.896 
(.062) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Household Confidence .261
* 
3.584 
(.001) 
.226** 
1.558 
(.125) 
.277*** 
2.207 
(.030) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Business Credit .727
**** 
9.121 
(.000) 
.243**** 
1.935 
(.059) 
.159**** 
1.271 
(.208) 
 
Adjust. R-squared .655 .387 .147 
 
DW .456 2.666 .912 
 
F-Test (Sig.) 37.961 (.000) 9.698 (.000) 4.500 (.003) 
Table 5.4 Hypothesis 3 
From the table we can see that business credit is a strong explanatory variable for business 
fixed investment in the US. In Norway however, we find that this variable does not have any 
significant influence over fixed investments. As in Hypothesis 2, the coefficients for the 
target interest rates do not provide the results as the hypothesis indicates. If business fixed 
investments serves as an indicator of increased economic activity, and growing activity after 
a while is met with raised target rates, then the results could be in tune with reality, but 
affected by countercyclical policy. The remaining variables state roughly what the 
hypothesis claims, with US business confidence strangely proving insignificant.  
Hypothesis 4: Residential construction 
As we saw, business fixed investment was at least somewhat influenced by the variables we 
put forth. Thus, we now want to transfer this thinking over to the residential market, and see 
if the same independent variables from Hypothesis 3 can explain the changes within the 
construction of living spaces. Here, we have formulated the following model: 
ResidentialConstructiont = β0 + β1BusinessCreditt + β2FedTargett  
+ β3BusinessConfidencet + β4HouseholdConfidencet + µ 
(12) 
                                                                                                                                                      
105 European Commission, Eurostat 
106 Statistics Norway 
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The data for residential construction is gathered from the Fed.
107
 The results are presented in 
table 5.5. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Increase in Residential 
Construction****  
 
Region: USA EA NOR 
  
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Target Interest .388
*** 
3.134 
(.002) 
.328* 
2.311 
(.025) 
.092*** 
.967 
(.336) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Household Confidence .172
* 
1.455 
(.150) 
.086** 
.554 
(.582) 
.380*** 
3.513 
(.001) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Business Confidence .079
**** 
.750 
(.455) 
.233**** 
1.531 
(.132) 
.165*** 
1.862 
(.066) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Business Credit -.194
**** 
-1.725 
(.089) 
-.555**** 
-4.155 
(.000) 
-.269**** 
-2.491 
(.015) 
 
Adjust. R-squared .383 .305 .366 
 
DW .698 .630 1.813 
 
F-Test (Sig.) 13.129 (.000) 7.024 (.000) 12.675 (.000) 
Table 5.5 Hypothesis 4 
For the US the results gained from this test do not correlate well with what we saw in the 
graphs earlier. The same suggestion concerning the target rate in the previous test could also 
be possible here. For Norway however, we can find household confidence as a significant 
positive coefficient. This can indicate that an important driving force in the building of 
residences in Norway is influenced by households’ faith in the future. Next, we will test 
models explaining housing prices, which is highly relevant for Norway.  
Hypothesis 5: Housing prices 
Lastly, we want to test the increases in housing prices. Here, we want to investigate if 
increases in household confidence and credit lead to raised housing prices, and have thus 
formulated the following model:  
HousingPricest = β0 + β1HouseholdCreditt + β2FedTargett  
+ β3HouseholdConfidencet + µ 
(13) 
The data for housing prices have been gathered from the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency,
108
 from the ECB,
109
 and from SSB.
110
 The results are presented in table 5.6. 
                                                 
107 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (d) 
108 Federal Housing Finance Agency 
109 European Central Bank (a) 
110 Statistics Norway 
 62 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Increase in Housing 
Prices**  
 
Region: USA EA NOR 
  
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Stand. 
Coeff. 
T-test 
(Sig.) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Target Interest .400
*** 
5.592 
(.000) 
.653* 
4.639 
(.000) 
.385*** 
4.405 
(.000) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Household Confidence .311
** 
4.205 
(.000) 
.197** 
1.530 
(.132) 
.176**** 
2.002 
(.049) 
Independent 
Variable: 
Household Credit .525
**** 
8.305 
(.000) 
.261**** 
1.977 
(.053) 
.466**** 
5.251 
(.000) 
 
Adjust. R2-squared .719 .255 .390 
 
DW .516 .244 .986 
 
F-Test (Sig.) 67.609 (.000) 7.260 (.000) 18.264 (.000) 
Table 5.6 Hypothesis 5 
Out of the hypothesis we have tested, it appears that this is the one that provides the highest 
amount of significant coefficients. Regarding the coefficients for target interest rates, the 
same tendency – seen in the two earlier hypotheses – is present. What is interesting here is 
firstly the strong significant positive value found on US household credit. This could 
validate the idea that growth in household credit did lead to rising housing prices; leading in 
turn to more mortgage refinancing and debt, as prices continued to ascend. Secondly, we 
find a significant positive relationship between Norwegian housing prices and household 
confidence. The housing debate in Norway generally revolves around what the causes of the 
seemingly ever-growing housing prices might be. Whilst some claim that the rising prices 
are based on fundamental conditions, the results presented in this test imply that part of the 
price increases could be due to psychological aspects. 
Summary of regression analyses 
We conducted these regression tests in an attempt to establish causality between growing 
confidence, debt, and prices. As we have seen, there seems to be a relationship between 
decreasing target rates, and increasing household- and business credit. We have also seen 
that the growing confidence and credit explains some of the growth within businesses’ fixed 
investments, and within residential construction. We have also to a degree established 
explanations for changes within housing prices.  
The target rate coefficients seldom provided a value coherent with our hypotheses. However, 
as already explained, this could very well be a natural result of the countercyclical policies 
conducted by central banks. The aspects that have been brought forward give a brief view 
into the explanatory power of Minsky’s theory. We have chosen to put our focus on what we 
believe to be the primary, namely the credit financed bubble within the housing market. We 
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make the assumption that the speculation relating to sub-prime bonds market amplified the 
crisis severely, but would perhaps have been of a smaller scale had there not been such easy 
access to credit for people unable to service their loans. The regression analyses did indicate 
that the conclusions we made might be valid. However, due to the limited number of 
observations, and the complexity that surrounds macroeconomic analyses, these tests should 
only be taken as a supplement to our graphical assessment.  
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6. Post-08 policy similarities and differences 
In this chapter, we will present qualitative data on the fiscal and monetary policy conducted 
after the housing bubble in order to assess our second research question: Are the same 
recovery policies conducted today, on the way out of the housing bubble? Fiscal- and 
monetary policies are separately going to be assessed and compared against the policies after 
the IT-bubble, which were discussed in the previous chapter.  
6.1 Fiscal policies  
We will start out by discussing the major happenings relevant to fiscal policy in our three 
regions. Again, the euro area is not focused on due to its diverse fiscal policy. This 
discussion is going to be followed up by a brief comparison to the period before the housing 
bubble, and some analysis of the key differences. All details on the Norwegian and 
American budgets are again gathered from the website of the Norwegian government
111
 and 
the Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER)
112
 – if not other 
sources are stated. 
Norway is experiencing slower growth in 2008, which is expected to continue fading. To 
cope with the ongoing problems, Norway increase its use of oil revenue and the spending 
reach the four percent line of “handlingsregelen”, after laying below for the last three years. 
In the later revision of the Norwegian budget the oil corrected structural deficit is increased 
from 92 billion NOK to 101.5 billion NOK.
113
 After the financial stress really hit the global 
markets a stimulus package is passed January 26
th
, 2009, with a proposal to increase 
spending with 16.75 billion NOK and cut taxes by 3.25 billion NOK.
114
 The Norwegian 
political opposition criticized the stimulus package for its lack of tax cuts.
115
 The stimulus 
package of 20 billion NOK contained environment, transportation, infrastructure, and 
housing as priorities.  
                                                 
111 The Norwegian government 
112 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (b) 
113 Finansdepartementet (2009a) 
114 Finansdepartementet (2009b) 
115 Bakken, Krekling, Lilleås, & Nordbø (2009) 
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USA starts out with an optimistic view in early 2008, when planning the 2009 budget. Tax 
reliefs that where due to expire in 2010 are renewed; the budget is moderate; and the 
spending is aimed at a slower growth than the overall economy.  
On February 17
th
, 2009, President Obama had just taken office, and signed the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act into law. It contained an estimated $150 billion tax relief,
116
 
entitlement programs, and federal contracts, grants and loans. This stimulus package is $787 
billion in total,
117
 and where increased to $840 billion in the 2012 budget. The package is 
ongoing, different programs have different expiring dates.  
The next two years, 2010 and 2011, the Norwegian economy experience low unemployment 
rate, spending above “handlingsregelen”, and no change in tax levels.  In 2012 and 2013 the 
spending in brought below “handlingsregelen”, and the fiscal policy is more restrictive. Still, 
Norwegian legislatures face a complex picture. The export industry is weakened by the 
global stress. 
The American budget continues a very expensive fiscal policy; gaining debt, investing in 
infrastructure, job creation, clean energy, health care, and more effective governance. The 
Affordable Care Act (better known as “ObamaCare”) was signed into law in 2010, but still 
faces resistance in the congress.
118
 President Obama is also making a somewhat opposite 
move than his predecessor Bush, by pushing for the elimination of the tax relief for people 
with an income above $250 000 and offering a relief for people with an income below.  
With several years of expansive fiscal policy, the Americans are facing huge deficits. The 
Budget Control Act (2011) is passed to reduce the spending they accumulated in the process 
of jumpstarting the economy. To help people struggling in the aftermath of the housing 
bubble, the Home Affordable Modification Program was launched. It was followed by the 
“we can’t wait” campaign, which supports house refinancing and make responsible 
borrowers, who has little or on equity, able to take advantages of the low interest rates. By 
the 2013 budget the fiscal policy is more restrictive, or less expansive with regard to the 
continually deficit. The President is advocating for people to “pay their fair share”. Deficits 
                                                 
116 U.S. Department of the Treasury 
117 Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (2009) 
118 FOX News (2013b) 
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are to be reduced by; cutting wasteful programs; tax hikes for top earners, by Bush, faced 
obsolescence, and; a tax cut for people earning less. 
In the euro area they have taken extraordinary actions after 2008 – in which most, on the 
continental level, were monetary. However, the finance ministers from across the euro area 
have just come to an agreement on a banking union. Details on bailout practice are still not 
agreed upon.
119
 
Comparison and analysis 
Looking at figure 5.1 Surplus and deficit, one can easily spot the similar fall in the direction 
of deficit – after the IT-bubble and the housing bubble – for all our regions. The latter case 
was definitely of a greater magnitude. For Norway this mainly meant increased use of oil 
revenue. In USA they even had the “we can’t wait” campaign, which was dangerously 
similar to subprime. We will now do some brief assessments of some selected differences.  
To the degree government projects fail, we consider them to be inert in the manner presented 
in subchapter 3.3 on deficit finance. Even government projects that make a profit we find 
reasons to question, due to the opportunity costs and the discoordinating forces of 
government interference.
120
 There are also projects we argue are inherently inert, like the 
Norwegian stimulus spending on environment projects and the American “ObamaCare”. 
Norwegian projects on climate can only reach symbolic achievements, and “ObamaCare” 
cannot contribute any resources; it distorts market signals.
121
 The inert government projects 
spending puts an upward pressure on the interest rate, which make a positive shift in the 
demand in market for loanable funds, allowing the central bank to print more money on its 
given target. The PPF, which now has the public sector included, turns more investment-
intensive – decreasing the later stages of production. The inert projects also shrink the earlier 
stages, making the whole Hayekian triangle smaller. Spending on project which has no 
economic value will shrink the economy. What we will take with us from this discussion is 
only that to the extent the stimulus projects is inert they will shrink the economy, not grow it. 
There are also unseen opportunity costs that contribute negative consequences. We still 
regard this as a marginal issue compared to monetary policy.  
                                                 
119 O'Donnelly & Santa (2013) 
120 Catalan (2011) 
121 Vidal (2009) 
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The regions stimulus packages are also being spent on infrastructure, which draw a different 
picture. The major difference in this application, from the one of inert projects, is that the 
Hayekian triangle expands on the earlier stages. The hypotenuse of the triangle rotates in the 
opposite direction compared to the interest rate which is pressed up. This is characteristic of 
countercyclical spending. Garrison assumes in this model that the government allocates the 
resources like the market would by itself. We don’t consider this a good move. It’s in 
essence the same as initiating a pyramid project when there is a famine. It is also a 
malinvestment, because it is financed by savings that doesn’t exist, waiting for a new crunch. 
To the degree these policies are conducted, we regard them as contributions to new 
problems. Although we also consider these points marginal compared to monetary policy.  
6.2 Monetary policies  
This sub-chapter will follow the same structure as the previous one. First, we will present 
some aspects of the monetary policies conducted after the housing bubble, by each of the 
three central banks. This will be followed by a brief comparison and analysis. The sources of 
this subchapter are mainly from the three central banks’ monetary reports,122 if not otherwise 
is stated.  
Federal Reserve 
The Fed launched three groups of programs, each with their respective recipient. We will 
only mention the programs that most strongly contributed to the growth of Fed’s balance 
sheet. The programs were focused on the following:
123
 
1. Provision of liquidity to banks and dealers 
2. Provision of liquidity to other market participants 
3. Direct purchases of assets 
The first program had the strongest contribution to the growth of the balance sheet. This 
liquidity provision was conducted through the Term Auction Facility (TAF) (expanded by 
$450 billion), and the liquidity swaps made with foreign central banks (expanded by $375 
billion). The Fed also lent out $115 billion in securities through the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TLF).  
                                                 
122 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013a); European Central Bank (2013), and; Norges Bank (2013) 
123 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009) 
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The TAF provided term funds to depository institutions against various collaterals which 
were used to secure loans at the discount window. This increased institutions access to 
funding, which helped them meet customers’ credit needs. The Fed also provided dollars to 
other central banks through swaps, as the need for such was increasing dramatically after the 
crisis hit. The Term Securities Lending Facility was also set up in order to better credit 
conditions for primary dealers, and improving general conditions in the financial markets. 
Through the TSLF, the “Federal Reserve lends up to $200 billion of Treasury securities to 
primary dealers for a term of 28 days [rather than overnight, as in the regular securities 
lending program].”124 
The second group of programs was directed primarily towards other market participants. 
Here, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) program was the strongest contributor 
to the growth of the balance sheet. Through the CPFF, a "special purpose vehicle" was 
created that provided Federal Reserve credit by "purchas[ing] commercial paper of eligible 
issuers."
125
 The CPFF is responsible for some of the measures that have commonly become 
known as quantitative easing (QE). From 2008 to 2009, the purchases made by the CPFF 
increased the Fed balance sheet by close to $250 billion. Between March and October 2009, 
$300 billion of longer-term securities were purchased.
126
 
The Fed announced in November 2010 the first round of QEs by stating that they “intended 
to purchase an additional $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the 
second quarter of 2011”.127 In the fall of 2011 the Fed introduced the second round of QEs 
by stating the intention to purchase $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining 
maturities of six years to 30 years, to push down long term interest rates.
128
 The Fed would 
also sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of three years or 
less. The fed started this program of QEs with purchasing bonds for $30 billion a month in 
2010, followed by an increase to $45- and $85 billion in 2012. 
The final group consists of the purchases of short-term debt obligations issued by Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. In order to: "reduce the cost and 
increase the availability of  residential mortgage credit,"
129
 the Fed implemented a program 
                                                 
124 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009, p. 48) 
125 Ibid. (p. 49) 
126 Amadeo (2013) 
127 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011, p. 37) 
128 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012, p. 41) 
129 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009, p. 50) 
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that would purchase, "up to $100 billion in direct obligations of housing related government 
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and up to $500 billion in MBS backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and Ginnie Mae.”130 
European Central Bank 
The ECB chose in 2009 to implement “enhanced credit support”, that was somewhat similar 
to the ones implemented by the Fed. The ECB chose to implement five measures, which 
primarily focused on helping banks gain access to funds through providing “unlimited 
liquidity at a fixed rate in all refinancing operations against adequate collateral.”131 The ECB 
did also initiate two programs for purchasing covered bonds (one going from 2009-2010, 
and one from 2011-2012). Under the first program, purchases were made to the nominal 
value of €60 billion, and €16.4 billion under the second one.132 The ECB also provided US 
dollars to the market through swap agreements with the Fed. 
Norges Bank 
Even though Norway focused on fiscal stimulus, NB also chose to implement monetary 
measures. As the Fed and the ECB, NB provided liquidity to banks in need. This was done 
by giving banks access to liquidity in an otherwise illiquid market, and they provide fix term 
loans with longer time to maturity.
133
 NB also provided the Norwegian economy with US 
dollars in the same way as the ECB. 
Comparison and analysis 
After the IT-bubble, central banks opted for traditional tools, i.e. low target interest rates, in 
their attempt to stimulate the economy. Figure 6.1 illustrates how similar the reactions to the 
housing bubble were to the previous, with a comparison of the two periods, containing 
monthly interest rates.
134
 Today’s difference is magnitude, with regards to the time and 
intensity of the expansive policy.  
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
131 European Central Bank (2010, p. 17) 
132 European Central Bank (2012) 
133 Norges Bank (2008a & 2011)  
134 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (c); European Central Bank (c), and; Norges Bank (a) 
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Figure 6.1Target interest rates comparison 
Several trillion dollars have entered the market since 2007. Comparing the effects of 
stimulus packages to the one of a low interest rate policy is somewhat beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, it should be noted that the intended effects of QEs is the same as the 
one with lowering interest rates, namely stimulate expansion through easing the access to 
credit. As we saw of the analysis in chapter 5.2.2 The Minskian perspective, the easy access 
to credit was an influential factor in the creation of the housing bubble. If such an event was 
brought on with the aid of low target rates, one can speculate in what the additional trillions 
of dollars of stimulus might lead to. The ECB and NB, to variously degrees, chose to 
implement the same measures as the Fed, and the conclusions naturally go for these regions 
as well: the same type of expansive monetary policy are being conducted today with the 
significantly added strength of stimulus packages.  
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7. From IT-bubble, to housing bubble, to…? 
In this chapter we will assess our third research question: Are we heading for a new wave of 
financial crises? What kind and how? We will do this by first looking at potential bubbles in 
our three regions. The latest news that we find relevant will be integrated in the theoretical 
and empirical assessment, to make this discussion as forward looking as our resources 
allows it to be. To answer the “how?” we will propose two possible scenarios of courses of 
events. The Austrian school of economics will be the primary perspective of this chapter. We 
have made this decision because we find – from experience in working with the previous 
chapters – this school of thought to have strong qualities in understanding the underlying 
factors in the business cycle. This chapter concludes our assessment, and will be followed by 
our conclusions. 
7.1 Potential bubbles  
We will discuss the likelihood for bubbles or crises in the stock markets, the public 
surplus/deficit situations, potential malinvestments, and potential new housing bubbles. The 
segment is going to be structured around each region.  
7.1.1 USA 
To assess the American stock market we have taken HP-filter on the two major stock 
exchanges; S&P 500 in figure 7.1 and Dow Jones.
135
 Both are monthly index data from 
01.1980 to 10.2013 from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and are presented with a HP-
trend.   
                                                 
135 Appendix: Dow Jones Industrial Average  
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Figure 7.1 S&P 500 
The peaks of the IT-bubble and the housing bubble are both in the shadow of today’s all-
time highs. However, this picture does not necessarily indicate a bubble by itself, but offer 
strong arguments in that direction considering the severe monetary expansions the last five 
years. There is reason to believe a major portion of the later growth could be malinvestment. 
We think there is a potential bubble in both American stock exchanges – a possible equity 
bubble. Janet Yellen on the other hand, who is to take over for Bernanke in February 
2014,
136
 shows no concern for bubbles. She claims that, although the stock market has grown 
significantly, today’s conditions don’t indicate bubbles when looking at measures as price-
earnings ratio.
137
 We regard this as a weak and irrelevant argument. Looking at P/E ratio for 
S&P 500,
138
 we find our last value to be 17.66 in 04.2013. Consider the value was 17.7 in 
04.2007 just before the bust; Yellen’s argument is not valid. There were also high earnings 
in both observations, which make them even more similar. It is hard to know to what extent 
and in what balance price and earnings are inflated by monetary expansion as well, and it 
only represent information known in the present – the forecasting power is limited.  
The American deficit, as we saw in figure 5.1, has been there ever since 2000. It peaked on 
11.43 percent of GDP in 2009 and is still at 6.4 percent in 2013. It is also estimated to be 
around five percent in 2014 and 2015. Recent news also confirms this. The budget of 2014 is 
still not passed, and it does not look like the new budget will bring any shifts in direction; 
                                                 
136 Irwin (2013) 
137 Zumbrun & Kearns (2013) 
138 Appendix: S&P 500 P/E ratio 
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USA will keep accumulating debt.
139
 With an own central bank, and thereby an own printing 
press, it’s unlikely that USA is heading for any default. What is more plausible is a 
downgrade on the American bonds, which could make their lending more expensive with 
higher interest rate on long-term bonds. USA has some benefits that other currency-unions 
don’t enjoy. As the world trade oil in dollars, they are in the position to print more money 
without experiencing all the consequences of increase in their general price levels at home. 
There has been some news indicating that this could change, with China’s decreased interest 
in dollar reserves.
140
 We think that although USA will continue to accumulate debt for some 
time, they have no catastrophic near future due to the state of global financial institutions.    
Does USA have malinvestment? The assessment of the stock exchanges above says 
plausible, so do the later low interest rates and their production gap – which have been up to 
one percent the last two years as we saw in figure 5.5 Production gap. It is generally very 
hard to point at a potential case of malinvestment in the present. They are often unseen 
phenomenons until they burst. We regard the interest rate as the best hint. If the rate in 
manipulated below the market, investors will lend and invest in projects they otherwise 
couldn’t afford. Today’s interest rates are clearly manipulated below the natural rate, in the 
name of countercyclical policy. The complexity of the economy makes it hard to find 
empirical evidence of malinvestments. However, we argue deductively that as long as the 
interest rate is manipulated, there will be malinvestments. The low rates are in essence a 
subsidy of money. Which, like all other commodities, encourage higher “consume”. We do 
find plausibility of malinvestment in USA.  
With regard to housing, we don’t see any potential bobble in the case of USA. If there is 
malinvestments, they seem to be of no isolated threat to the near future – the activity has 
been low since the crash.
141
 
To make a brief summary on USA, we see potential bubbles in the stock market despite 
Yellen’s argument. The deficit will continue for some time, but function more as brakes than 
as any nearby threat. We see deductively potential for general malinvestments, but no major 
ones in the housing market.  
                                                 
139 Fox News (2013a) 
140 Bloomberg News (2013) 
141 Appendix: Housing starts – USA (A) 
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7.1.2 Euro area 
We find no sign of major bubbles in the FTSE Eurotop 100 Europe stock index.
142
 This is of 
course by looking at the surface. With regard to the historically low interest rates and 
monetary expansions, there is possibility that even today’s moderate levels could be 
unsustainable.  
The euro area has, like USA, been in deficit for a long time, as of figure 5.1 Surplus and 
deficit. They hit a peak in 2009 on 6.35 percent of GDP, and are forecasted to lay around 2.5 
percent in 2014 and 2015. Of course, the euro area is a diverse region – including countries 
like Germany and Greece. However, we argue that the nature of their union constitutes more 
financial problems than that of USA. The euro area carries a bureaucracy on a whole other 
level than America. The Telegraph
143
 measured the time several countries’ use to carry out 
business in a general selection of fields.
144
 USA got an average of 100 days, against Italy 
with 420 days. Germany was the best among the countries in the euro area, with an average 
on 128.75 days.
145
 The nature of their currency-union brings trouble, but some weaker 
countries may find protection in it.  
In assessing the euro area’s potential malinvestments, we refer to the same arguments made 
in the case of USA. We think the low interest rates do distort market signals and contribute 
to unsustainable undertakings of projects.  
The housing market in the euro area is similar to the American. But in Europe the trend has 
still a negative slope.
146
 We find no reason to fear any housing bubbles in this region. The 
values are at the lowest of our time series, which starts in 1980.  
To sum up on the euro area, we find some potential for bubbles, but not in any empirically 
explicit state. The housing and stock market does not seem to carry too much 
malinvestments. They have a deficit that is smaller than the case of USA, but we still think 
the euro area will have more problems with theirs. Their inability to do efficient business 
                                                 
142 Appendix: FTSE Eurotop 100 Europe 
143 Quilty-Harper (2011) 
144 I.e.: construction permits, commercial electricity connected, commercial contracts, and export goods. 
145 Zero Hedge (2011) 
146 Appendix: Housing starts – euro area 
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could be an explanation for why they haven’t produced any bubbles, considering 
malinvestments actually takes work to create.
147
   
7.1.3 Norway 
Norway is a special case, with its richness on natural resources. We regard the current 
general growth in Norway as more sustainable, due to more sound resource exportation. The 
unusual strong financial position of the government sets other premises for the practice of 
lender of last resort. The other regions hit huge deficits in 2009, bailing out their industries. 
The Norwegian government practiced the same policies but, as we saw in figure 5.1 Surplus 
and deficit, did not face any serious damage. We consider this a short-term blessing, but a 
long-term curse. The public sector doesn’t play by the market rules; it does not adhere to 
price signals. We argue that the richer a government is the further away from the rules of the 
market it tend to get. This lay the foundation for the commonly known Dutch disease.  
The Norwegian stock market has climbed above the heights of 2007 and 2008, illustrated in 
figure 7.2. Our data are monthly the last 15 years from Statistics Norway through 
Datastream. NBER US recessions are highlighted in grey,
148
 and the nominal sight deposit 
rate is included in the lower part of the figure. Although we see arguments for a more 
sustainable growth here than in other regions, the low interest rates with its corollary 
monetary expansions of the latest growth period still indicate malinvestment. The empirical 
argument of high stock prices is not strong if there is reasons to believe there is underlying 
fundamental values to back up the growth. However, from a deductive perspective, we think 
much of the growth is attributed to manipulated interest rates. We don’t see how the 
Norwegian stock market would perform the same with higher rates.  
                                                 
147 This statement needs some elaboration: The euro area conduct policies we argue create bubbles. The lack of explicit 
bubbles in our data and their slow business might therefore have a relationship.  
148 Norwegian recessions were not available in Datastream. 
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Figure 7.2 Oslo Stock Exchange with nominal sight deposit rate 
With only national factors taken into account, the stock market could experience major 
corrections if or when the sight deposit rate approach six percent again. Due to the 
robustness of the Norwegian economy alone, we think that in order for a crisis to occur, 
there needs to be major internal shocks or disturbances from abroad.  
With regards to possible deficits, we don’t see it as a problem for Norway in the near future 
(as of figure 5.1). It might be more relevant in later discussions, as consequences of the 
Dutch disease develop. For the time scope of this thesis, it is not relevant.   
Just as the above discussion on Norway, the complexity and disturbance of a rich economy 
makes it hard to identify malinvestments. Figure 5.5 Production gap indicates a positive 
production gap for Norway. It could be a signal of overproduction. The strong general 
economic outlook says no, the low interest rate says yes. We consider the problem of 
malinvestments to be there in kind, but to a minor degree – excluding the housing market.  
Looking at the constructions of new buildings in Norway,
149
 it is hard to say if it’s a bubble, 
an answer to a growing population and richer households, or a recovery from periods of 
financial stress. In recent news we learned that the construction numbers had fallen with 39 
percent.
150
 It doesn’t determine anything – the numbers are volatile of nature. However, it’s 
interesting in the light of our analyses of chapter 5.2.1 where we found housing construction 
                                                 
149 Appendix: Housing starts – Norway  
150 Utheim (2013) 
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to peak before all the other data we looked at. With the Norwegian target rate unchanged, 
this suggests the possibility of a real resource crunch. The next figure draws a somewhat 
different picture. Under, in figure 7.3, we see the extraordinary growth in stock of orders for 
all construction since the 90’s. Not only are we above today’s trend: When a bubble grow 
long enough the HP-trend line will adjust itself to it. We saw a freighting example of that in 
the case of USA.
151
 To illustrate how wrong the HP-filter could be, we made one of 
American housing starts where we only used data up until the peak in 2006.
152
 Here, the 
lambda of 10 million where more correct – contrary the statement of Bjørnland et al. (2004) 
(that greater lambda gives greater problems). As we see it, they are correct for as long as 
actual values equal fundamental values. With a bubble, the HP-filter is more correct on 
higher lambda values. We have therefore included a trend line of a higher lambda in figure 
7.3. The data are quarterly from 01.1976 to 07.2013, form Statistics Norway through 
Macrobond.  
 
Figure 7.3 Stock of orders, Housing – Norway 
To the degree it is applicable, the green line could indicate a potential for a housing crash 
greater than that of 2008. Considering the nature of the HP-analysis, the bust of 2008 made 
the trend line flatter. A new crash would do the same. This means that future analyses of 
these data might find our present levels to be a major bubble. Each steep period of growth, 
                                                 
151 Appendix: Housing starts – USA (A)  
152 Appendix: Housing starts – USA (B) 
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approximately from 2002 to 2007 and 2009 until today, are characterized with historically 
low interest rates. This joins our arguments for malinvestment.  
To add some weight to this argument for a Norwegian housing bubble we include an 
analysis of real estate prices from the same source as above. This time we use a lambda 
value of 80 000 on quarterly data from 01.1992 to 07.2013 in figure 7.4.  
 
Figure 7.4 Real estate prices – Norway 
The analysis of real estate prices tells much of the same story. Also here we could imagine 
how a bust would flatten the trend line in future analyses. Of the potential bubbles we have 
examined, we regard this as a clear case. That does not necessarily mean it has to burst. If 
the regulations are kept tight, the fundamental values might catch up with the price 
development. This is yet an example of how monetary policy makes an artificial need for 
regulations. The fact that the Austrian business cycle theory has been shown fit to explain 
Norwegian business cycles earlier strengthens our argument.
153
  
From other recent news
154
 we learn that the housing prices are flattening and that 
households’ credit is still rising. There is a limit to how much people can afford pay for 
housing; we therefore expect a slower market until the (possible) bust. To sum this 
discussion up, we find potential for bubbles in both the stock- and housing market.  
                                                 
153 Bjerkenes, Kiil, & Anker-Nilssen (2010) 
154 Norges Bank (2012b) 
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7.2 Scenarios  
On the basis of our above discussions, we will now look at two scenarios that we regard as 
likely – to answer the “how?” in the third research question. Negative estimates of the future, 
in times that are considered good, are often not taken seriously – especially by advocates of 
the conducted policies. We argue that the mainstream blame of the crises is put in the wrong 
place, and we challenge the system itself. Prices are market signals, blaming the failing bank 
is therefore equal to shooting the messenger. It is the system that sends the message.  
A precondition for building scenarios is the initial point. It is hard to state if we are in a 
situation equal to 2003 or 2006. The market could have been in the situation of 2003 for 
years now, building up the potential for the bubble of all times. In many cases, we think this 
is true, that the regions still are in early stages of malinvestments. At the same time, this 
allows for action to be taken. The question of destiny is therefore concluding this subchapter. 
First, we will discuss the possible scenarios of credit crunch and real resource crunch. We 
want to stress that the following is possible scenarios, and not factual claims. We think they 
are likely in kind, but that the degrees are extremely hard to measure. To make our 
understanding of causal relationships clear, we want our predictions to be explicit – which 
mean that this subchapter will consist of much of our own reflections.  
7.2.1 Credit crunch 
A credit crunch is what we regard as the most likely outcome of today’s situation. This is 
because it is only a matter of time before all the new money hits the general price levels. 
When or before it does, the central banks are going to increase its interest rates in order to 
avoid runaway inflation. This action will crunch the malinvestments which accumulated in 
the times of low rates. A credit crunch is worst for smaller businesses, as the bigger ones 
often have the opportunity to get funded by their own long bonds. For this reason, among 
others, we regard monetary policy as anti-social and unfair.  
We will now examine the possibility of a credit crunch in each region. In figure 7.5 we have 
gathered data on CPI for all regions; from 01.2000, to 09.2013 for USA, and to 10.2013 for 
the euro area and Norway. All are monthly year-to-year change, except Norway, where we 
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only could obtain annual data. All are gathered through Macrobond, but source back to 
different places.
155
  
 
Figure 7.5 Consumer Price Index 
Above we see that the CPI of USA is at moderate levels. The last observation was on 1.2 
percent in 09.2013. We have to take these numbers with caution. CPI only measures the last 
stage of the Hayekian triangle – i.e. consumer good prices. It is the last place in the economy 
where the new money takes effect. As we see it, the strongest virtue of CPI is to predict the 
central banks’ action, because they put much weight on these aggregates.  
We will now focus of the case of USA. Below, in figure 7.6, we have a comparison on 
monetary base, M1, and M2. All seasonal adjusted from 01.2000 to 10.2013. All of these are 
gathered from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
                                                 
155 Data for USA are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the euro area are from Eurostat, and for Norway are from 
OECD Economic Outlook.  
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Figure 7.6 Money supply – USA 
What is interesting in the above chart is the monetary base crossing M1 in late 2008. We 
view this as a ticking bomb. As Keister and McAndrews points out,
156
 increased reserves 
measured by monetary base does not say anything about to what degree the banks are 
lending the new money out. It will still end up on the banks deposits in the Federal Reserve. 
We have however seen some credit expansion, but not in any way that reflects this huge 
increase in reserves. It is therefore clear that there are much excessive reserves in the banks. 
The much debated question is: Why are the banks not lending it out? Keister and 
McAndrews offers two reasons.
157
 First, there have been interest rates on banks deposits in 
Federal Reserve since 2008, which gives them incentives to keep it deposited. Second, due 
to higher risk premiums in the interbank market after the housing bubble the banks face a 
low opportunity cost when the money is deposited in the Federal Reserve. This could all 
change as soon as market conditions get better. To avoid hyperinflation the Federal Reserve 
has to exit the expansive policy. In Bernanke’s testimony of February 2010158 he presents an 
exit strategy that we sum up in seven points:
159
 
1. Liquidity facilities are designed to be reduced when the financial conditions 
improves 
2. Normalize the discount window between loans and deposits 
3. Let bonds mature without buying new ones 
                                                 
156 Keister & McAndrews (2009) 
157 Ibid. 
158 Bernanke (2010) 
159 Our seven points are inspired by Keister & McAndrews (2009) 
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4. Increased interest rates on reserves  
5. Offer term deposits, which is not counted on as reserves 
6. Reverse repo transactions  
7. Reverse open market purchase (i.e. selling bonds) 
We choose to disregard point one, two, and three because they are passive, and point five 
and six because they only are temporary solutions. The focus is therefore on four and seven 
because they bring “real permanent” change. The Fed first said they were determined to 
continue an expansive monetary policy for as long as the unemployment rate is above 6.5 
percent and inflation stays under 2.5 percent.
160
 The unemployment rate is reported down to 
seven percent on December 6
th
 2013.
161
 Despite unemployment and inflation not crossing the 
lines, they just come out announcing the drawdown of QE.
162
 This surprises us, but we think 
it is too late, as figure 7.7 illustrates, and that this is the first step in the direction of a credit 
crunch. The exit will ultimately drive up the short interest rates, causing the short rates to 
invert against the longer rates in the yield curve.
163
  
 
Figure 7.7 Yield curves – USA 
                                                 
160 Zumbrun & Kearns (2013) 
161 Groshen (2013) 
162 Adams (2013) 
163 Eeg (2007) found that the Norwegian key deposit rate had the most influence on the rates up to one year to maturity on 
the yield curve. On the longer rates, the central bank’s communication was more influential. Higher short rates constitute 
lower expectations of future inflation, which is a strong signal that keeps the long rates from rising. We regard these as 
applicable for USA, and a good explanation for the relationship between the short and the longer rates in figure 7.7 and 7.8 
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Figure 7.7 above depict daily rates the last 15 years with NBER recessions highlighted in 
grey, and it is taken from Datastream and Thomson Reuters. We see how the yield curve 
inverts in good time before the housing bubble, making the credit crunch. Now in the 
following years up until today, we have the same situation, but much more dramatic in terms 
of distance between the short and the longer rates. We think (with the slowdown of QE) an 
accompanied increased interest rate will offset a credit crunch – liquidating the potential 
malinvestments we found in the stock market. It will have consequences on the public 
sectors finances, as it gets higher interest rates on its obligations. The government may also 
be tempted to conduct yet another round of bailouts, moving the problems from one place to 
another. The housing market will experience corrections, but maybe not as dramatic as of 
2008.  
The euro area has not produced much that could indicate bubbles, as seen with HP-filters 
earlier. We think their deficits and the nature of their policies is going to make problems for 
them also in the future. Below, in the upper half of figure 7.8, we see the euro area’s short-
term rate against the ten year bond. The data is daily and monthly for the last 15 years. The 
source is Datastream and ECB, and NBER euro area recessions are highlighted in grey. Also 
here an inversion occurred before the 08-crisis. What is especially interesting with the euro 
area is the recession they had in 2012. It was preceded by a policy induced increase in the 
short-term rates. Even at these low levels, it appears as a credit crunch. This could be a sign 
of a dramatic case of malinvestments, when only a small increase in the short-term rates 
offset a recession lasting longer than the previous. Most of the problems are probably also 
postponed from 2008. The low interest rates that have followed, from then until today, does 
not make the situation any better. We think the euro area is in the onset of a serious case of 
credit crunch. From figure 7.5 Consumer Price Index, we saw that the inflation has not 
caught them yet. This could be a bad sign, as it provides the European Central Bank with a 
reason to keep the expansive policy going – and thereby making the existing problems 
bigger before facing it. In the lower half of figure 7.8 we have the daily three month T-bill 
for Norway against the monthly ten year bond – from Statistics Norway and Datastream, 
with US recessions highlighted in grey. We see a later, but steeper, inversion before the 
housing bubble. All of our regions have a special characteristic of their yield curve. 
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Figure 7.8 Yield curves – Euro area and Norway 
Norway is characterized by the small gap between the three month T-bill and the ten year old 
bond – which constitutes a more leveled curve. At the same time, of the three regions, 
Norway has the highest inflation (figure 7.5). Our last observation on 10.2013 of 2.42 
percent is approaching the objective which is supposed to be 2.5 percent over time.
164
 
As indicated, we don’t think Norway has the strongest general potential for a credit crunch. 
However, there are two weak links. The stock market could easily experience corrections 
from an increase in interest rates. We see that as very likely. The housing market could face 
huge consequences by a credit crunch. From figure 5.4 Credit gap – Households we see that 
Norway also has a credit gap, and that is from a trend that is not diminishing like in the case 
of the two other regions. The combination of high housing prices and households’ high 
credit, in a time with already low interest rates, is alarming. Because of all the prosperity 
Norwegians generally are faced with, they fail to identify their own bubble. The signs of a 
bubble are instead attributed to other aspects of their prosperity.
165
 
7.2.2 Real resource crunch 
Due to the similarities of credit- and real resource crunch, we are going to make this part on 
the latter very brief. We are only going to discuss what separates them, i.e. the market bid up 
the rate before the central bank takes action. If inflation doesn’t happen, the central banks are 
                                                 
164 Norges Bank (b) 
165 Thomton (2013) 
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going to be tempted to keep going at present terms. We don’t think they have the will to exit 
fully if not threatened by inflation. For this reason we think less inflation means that a real 
resource crunch is more likely. The oil prices below in figure 7.9
166
 provide an example on 
how prices could be bid up by the market on the onset of a crisis. Big projects were started 
on low interest rates before 2008, bigger than the existing resources could allow. When the 
market faced this lack, the resources were bid up – as the peak of 2008 illustrates in figure 
7.9. 
 
Figure 7.9 Oil prices 
As Hayek pointed out,
167
 the rate of increase in the money supply has to continuously 
increase in order to maintain the level of malinvestment. If the central banks don’t increase 
this rate of money supply, projects will eventually run dry and cause the real resource 
crunch. Prices on means of production will rise. There is reason to believe the general price 
level will follow this development – which could trigger a policy induced interest rate 
increase too. Either way, the bidding on resources will raise the short term rates, and 
eventually invert the yield curves.  
Here we face disagreement with conventional Keynes-inspired economics. The drought is a 
need for liquidity which, if given without representation, only will postpone and enlarge the 
problems. If we had free banking tomorrow, we would probably experience a real resource 
crunch as the liquidity injections stopped and the market corrected itself. We wouldn’t like a 
crunch, but we like the logic of it.  
                                                 
166 Data monthly from 07.1978 to 10.2013, gathered from Hamburg Institute of International Economics.  
167 Hayek 1969 
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The low inflation, 0.7 percent, could keep the ECB from increasing the rates, given 
continued trends, and thus make time for a real resource crunch to develop. However, this is 
too unpredictable to draw conclusions from. As mentioned earlier, Norway might experience 
a real resource crunch if the situation in the housing market develops further.  
7.2.3 Destiny? 
We think a credit- or real resource crunch is the most likely outcome of today’s situation. 
But, it is not a deterministic statement. As long as there is free will, there is possibility for 
change. We are on a dangerous path, but it is not our destiny. We have some thoughts on 
how our scenarios could be avoided.  
The interest rates needs to increase, slowly. This is to avoid further malinvestments. At the 
same time saving needs to be encouraged. Since the initial problem of money injections is 
fake signals of accessible saving, the only solution would be increased real saving. All tax on 
wealth should be abolished. The general tax system should be converted towards 
consumption, in order to encourage more productive priorities. This is however a difficult 
task. The habit of saving is in many aspects a cultural phenomenon, and evolves over 
generations.  
The same attitude needs to be adopted by the government as well. It should focus on its core 
function, protecting individual rights, which is the only thing a government can do that 
actually contributes to prosperity; it extracts force from society, allowing the market to 
function.
168
 The euro should also consider the need for its own existence. 17 nations with 
different cultures, needs, and demands are in our opinion too many for one bank to manage. 
The practice of bailout distorts incentives and should be abolished, together with the policies 
that put the banks in trouble in the first place. The ongoing development of a European 
banking union could result in increased bailout practice and perverted incentives.  
~ 
To sum up the chapter, we have the possibility of a credit- or real resource crunch, with 
runaway inflation as an alternative if the path continues. If the trend shifts, we also have the 
possibility of saving in what is lost in malinvestments, and thereby avoiding a crisis.  
                                                 
168 Brook (2010) 
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8. Conclusions 
In the perspectives of Minskian- and Austrian economics, we have conducted a comparative 
study of three regions; USA, the euro area, and Norway – from the “rescue” after the IT-
bubble, to the present and near future. We asked three research questions, which we assessed 
in separate chapters. The former question paved the way for the latter. The following 
conclusions have been reached.  
Did government intervention contribute to the housing bubble of 2008? 
On this much debated question, we assessed fiscal- and monetary policies separately. In the 
fiscal evaluation we did a qualitative study of the three regions. We found Garrison’s theory 
on fiscal policy to fit USA, and too a less extent on the euro area. Norway was excluded 
from the theoretical assessment. Our main finding was a consequence of deficit finance: 
Higher consumption, in combination with policy induced lower interest rates, is over-
consumption. This is because of the real demand the lowered rates create for savings that is 
not met due to said higher consumption. This finding was not expected, and calls for further 
investigation. Fiscal policy is seemingly more influential than we first anticipated. 
In the monetary assessment we did a – mainly graphical – study of Garrison’s boom and bust 
theory, followed by a qualitative study of Grytten’s model of “Minskian stages” and multiple 
regression analyses of Minskian theories. We found the Austrian boom and bust theory to fit 
the course of events between central banks’ monetary injections and the housing bubble. The 
American yield curves were also inverted from July 2006 to June 2007. The five Minskian 
stages offered a straightforward additional explanation of the housing bubble. Our multiple 
regression analyses might suffer from the exclusion of lags, but it did show a relationship 
between decreasing target rates, and increasing household- and business credit, and that 
growing confidence and credit could explain residential construction activity. On housing 
prices, American household credit and Norwegian household confidence proved to be 
influential. This strengthens the explanatory power of the “Minskian stages”.  
In the perspective of both our theoretical framework, we find explanations supporting a yes 
to our first question. Government intervention did contribute to the housing bubble. To what 
degree this is true calls for further – more specified – study. The second question emerge 
from the answer of the first.  
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Are the same recovery policies conducted today, on the way out of the housing bubble? 
Also in this assessment we decided to discuss fiscal- and monetary policy separately. In 
both, we found – through qualitative analyses – similarities. The differences were greater 
magnitude of both policies in the post housing bubble period. On fiscal policies we found 
repeated deficit spending, with increased use of oil revenue in the case of Norway. We saw 
examples of similarities to subprime in the USA, and deficit stimulus spending on inert 
government projects and infrastructure. The negative consequences of government spending 
on infrastructure (with emphasis on government, i.e. not infrastructure as such) might be 
more severe than we first thought – although it was too complex an issue for this thesis to 
discuss deeper. On monetary policies we found a very similar pattern in target interest rates 
for all regions. Like fiscal policies, it has additional magnitude – in e.g. QEs. We find it safe 
to conclude: yes, the same polices are conducted today. This leads us to the title of our thesis. 
Are we heading for a new wave of financial crisis? What kind and how? 
We do find reasons to fear more financial stress in the near future. The kind and manner 
differ for our regions, and there is possibility of rescue with saving – in both the political and 
the cultural realm. For USA, we see potential for an equity bubble. Their deficit situation 
may continue functioning as a brake on the economy. We see – deductively – potential for 
general malinvestments, but non for a housing bubble. Since the exit strategy is initiated, a 
credit crunch is most likely.  
For the euro area we do not empirically identify any bubbles. However, the way the region 
fell into a recession in 2012 after trying to increase the target rate, indicates a weak economy 
and general malinvestment. This could be crunched through credit or real resources 
depending on the patience of ECB.  
In the Norwegian economy we find potential for an equity- and/or housing bubble. Recent 
news could indicate that a real resource crunch is emerging in housing construction. 
However, Norway has lots of resources to prey on, and might need a greater shock in the 
form of a credit crunch to bellyflop.  
On the side, we find Minskian theories well fit to explain what happened, and Austrian 
theories well fit to explain how it happens – when assessing financial crises. The lesson most 
applicable to us personally, is to not enter the Norwegian housing market – yet. 
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Appendix 
The data presented in the following graphs are all gathered from reputable sources using the 
Macrobond service. The source and the URL are presented as footnotes. If not otherwise 
stated, a lambda equaling 1 600 have been applied for quarterly data, and 14 400 for monthly 
data. 
Target Interest Rates: 
The target rates for the central banks measured quarterly for the US
169
, and monthly for the 
rest. For the US, the Fed target rate is displayed; while for the ECB the rate on the Main 
Refinancing Operations
170
 is shown. For Norway, the sight deposit rate is displayed.
 171
  
 
Housing Starts – USA (A) 
For the US we have private housing units started, seasonally adjusted, monthly from 01.1980 
to 08.2013.
172
 The data are from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We chose a Lambda of 
40 000 due to endpoint error. As with the graphs for business confidence, we are showing 
each country’s data individually. 
                                                 
169 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DFEDTAR 
170 ECB: ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html 
171 NB: norges-bank.no/templates/pages/article.aspx?id=67652&epslanguage=en 
172 The Conference Board: conference-board.org/data/bci.cfm 
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Housing starts – USA (B) 
In the following graph, we have attempted to recreate the same graph an analyst would do in 
the end of 2005, before the housing market turned.
173
 As illustrated, a significantly higher 
value for lambda gives a better indicator of a potential bubble – if there is one.  
 
Housing starts – euro area  
                                                 
173 The Conference Board: conference-board.org/data/bci.cfm 
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For the Euro Area we have an index of dwellings and residential buildings permits issued for 
construction, seasonally adjusted, and quarterly from 01.1980 to 04.2013.
 174
 The data are 
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We chose a Lambda of 40 000 due to endpoint 
error. 
 
Housing starts – Norway 
For Norway we have dwellings construction started, seasonally adjusted, monthly from 
01.1983 to 09.2013. The data are from Statistics Norway, through Macrobond.
175
 We chose a 
Lambda of 40 000. 
                                                 
174 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ODCNPI03EZQ661S 
175 SSB: ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp?KortNavnWeb=byggeareal&CMSSubjectArea=bygg-
bolig-og-eiendom&PLanguage=1&checked=true 
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Business Confidence: 
Business confidence represents, in the same way as household confidence, how firms look 
upon the future. All the data have been seasonally adjusted by the source.
176,177,178
 The data 
for Norway is calculated as an average of the data from five different segments of the 
Norwegian economy based on quarterly data. These segments include, e.g., providers of 
consumer goods, and manufacturers. We have chosen to present each region individually 
since we found this to increase the ease of viewing due to the nature of the data. The US and 
the EA is measured on monthly data. 
USA: 
                                                 
176 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BSCICP02USM460S 
177 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BSCICP02EZM460S 
178
 SSB: ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp?KortNavnWeb=kbar 
&CMSSubjectArea=energi-og-industri&PLanguage=1&checked=true 
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Euro Area: 
 
Norway: 
SSB calculates the index values as the ”arithmetic average of the answers (balances) to the 
questions on production expectations, total stock of orders and inventories of own products 
(the latter with an inverted sign).”179  
 
                                                 
179 SSB: ssb.no/en/kbar 
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Household Confidence: 
The original quarterly numbers, which have been seasonally adjusted, represent how 
consumers (households) look upon the future.
180,181,182
 The values for EA and Norway have 
been divided by three, in order to get a more similar standard devaviation across the regions. 
The original observations were therefore more volatile. The data for the EA were also 
multiplied by (-1) due to every observation for consumer confidence being negative for the 
whole period.  
                                                 
180 The Conference Board: www.conference-board.org/data/bci.cfm 
181 The European Comission: ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys 
182 Finance Norway: fnh.no/no/hoved/aktuelt/sporreundersokelser/forventningsbarometeret 
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M2: 
The graphs are displaying the deviations from trend levels for the monetary measure M2. 
The numbers are, noted in national currency, measured monthly, and are seasonally adjusted 
by their respective sources.
183,184,185
  
 
Real-GDP: 
                                                 
183 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/M2 
184 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MYAGM2EZM196N 
185 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MABMM201NOM189N 
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
0
1
.2
0
0
0
0
8
.2
0
0
0
0
3
.2
0
0
1
1
0
.2
0
0
1
0
5
.2
0
0
2
1
2
.2
0
0
2
0
7
.2
0
0
3
0
2
.2
0
0
4
0
9
.2
0
0
4
0
4
.2
0
0
5
1
1
.2
0
0
5
0
6
.2
0
0
6
0
1
.2
0
0
7
0
8
.2
0
0
7
0
3
.2
0
0
8
1
0
.2
0
0
8
0
5
.2
0
0
9
1
2
.2
0
0
9
0
7
.2
0
1
0
0
2
.2
0
1
1
0
9
.2
0
1
1
0
4
.2
0
1
2
1
1
.2
0
1
2
0
6
.2
0
1
3
D
e
vi
at
io
n
s 
o
f 
Tr
e
n
d
 
US Household Confidence EA Household Confidence
NOR Household Confidence
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
0
1
.2
0
0
0
0
8
.2
0
0
0
0
3
.2
0
0
1
1
0
.2
0
0
1
0
5
.2
0
0
2
1
2
.2
0
0
2
0
7
.2
0
0
3
0
2
.2
0
0
4
0
9
.2
0
0
4
0
4
.2
0
0
5
1
1
.2
0
0
5
0
6
.2
0
0
6
0
1
.2
0
0
7
0
8
.2
0
0
7
0
3
.2
0
0
8
1
0
.2
0
0
8
0
5
.2
0
0
9
1
2
.2
0
0
9
0
7
.2
0
1
0
0
2
.2
0
1
1
0
9
.2
0
1
1
0
4
.2
0
1
2
1
1
.2
0
1
2
0
6
.2
0
1
3
D
e
vi
at
o
io
n
s 
o
f 
tr
e
n
d
 
USA EA NOR
 107 
To get the numbers for this graph, we chose the gross domestic products calculated by the 
expenditure approach for quarterly data. The original data is seasonally adjusted and in 
constant prices, noted in chained year-2000 national currencies for the US and the EA.
186,187
 
The chain year for Norway was not provided by the source.
188
 
 
Business Fixed Investment 
Firms’ fixed investment is for each region calculated using the expenditure approach on 
quarterly data, and presented in current prices.
189,190,191
 The numbers represent each 
countries’ gross private domestic fixed investment. Only the data for the US have been 
seasonally adjusted, and the numbers are presented as an index. The data for Norway 
naturally exclude investments made by the general government.  
                                                 
186 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/search?st=Gross+Domestic+Product+by+Expenditure+in+Const 
ant+Prices%3A+Total+Gross+Domestic+Product+for+Norway 
187 Fed: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/search?st=Gross+Domestic+Product+by+Expenditure+in+Constant 
+Prices%3A+Total+Gross+Domestic+Product+for+the+Euro+Area 
188 Fed: 
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/search?st=Gross+Domestic+Product+by+Expenditure+in+Constant+Prices%3A+Total+Gross
+Domestic+Product+for+the+United+States 
189 Bureau of Economic Analysis: bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm 
190 The European Commission: epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/introduction 
191 SSB: ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp?KortNavnWeb=knr&CMSSub 
jectArea=nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer&PLanguage=1&checked=true 
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Residential Construction: 
The data for the US is the total amount in millions of dollars that has been spent on private 
residential construction measured monthly for the US, and quarterly for the two 
others.
192,193,194
 The equivalent of this could not be found in for the EA and for Norway. 
Therefore, we have applied an index comprised of the permits issued for the construction of 
dweillings and residential buildings in these regions.  Out of the three, only the data for the 
US have been seasonally adjusted. 
                                                 
192 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/search?st=Total+Private+Construction+Spending%3A+Residential 
193 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/search?st=Dwellings+and+Residential+Buildings+Permits+Issu 
ed+for+Construction+for+Norway 
194 Fed: research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/search?st=Dwellings+and+Residential+Buildings+Permits+Issu 
ed+for+Construction+for+the+Euro+Area 
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Housing Prices:  
The real estate prices for each region are originally presented as indexes calculated quarterly. 
The indexes represent the price of all residential buildings in their respective 
regions.
195,196,197
  
 
 
                                                 
195 SSB: ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp?KortNavnWeb=bpi&CMSSu bjectArea=priser-og-
prisindekser&PLanguage=1&checked=true 
196 ECB: sdw.ecb.int/browseExplanation.do?node=2120781&trans=N 
197 Federal Housing Finance Agency: fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14 
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Dow Jones Industrial Average: 
Below, we have the Dow Jones Industrial index, depict monthly with a HP-filter.
198
 Gathered 
from Standard and Poor’s, through Macrobond.  
 
S&P 500 P/E ratio: 
S&P 500’s earnings (operating earnings) and P/E ratio are quarterly, gathered from Standard 
and Poor’s, through Macrobond.199, 200 
                                                 
198 S&P: DOW JONES INDICES: djindexes.com 
199 S&P: eu.spindices.com/resource-center/thought-leadership/market-commentary 
200 S&P: eu.spindices.com/resource-center/thought-leadership/market-commentary 
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FTSE Eurotop 100 Europe: 
The euro area stock index is gathered from FTSE through Datastream, daily the last 15 
years, containing highlighted NBER euro-recessions in grey.  
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